Virginia Commonwealth University

VCU Scholars Compass
Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

2012

Is TDR in Virginia DOA? A Study of the State of Transfer of
Development Rights Programs in Virginia
Alissa Akins
Virginia Commonwealth University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd
Part of the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
© The Author

Downloaded from
https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/2863

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at VCU Scholars Compass. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of VCU Scholars Compass.
For more information, please contact libcompass@vcu.edu.

Is TDR in Virginia DOA?
A Study of the State of Transfer of Development Rights Programs in Virginia
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Urban
and Regional Planning at Virginia Commonwealth University.

by
Alissa Marie Akins
Bachelor of Arts Honours Degree, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada, 2006

Director: Dr. Avrum J. Shriar, Associate Professor, Urban and Regional Studies and Planning
Virginia Commonwealth University Richmond, Virginia, August 2012

Acknowledgment

The author wishes to offer a sincere thank you to the many people who helped me along the way.
I would like to thank my loving and supportive family for their patience and unwavering support.
I would also like to thank my friends for encouraging me and always making me laugh. Last but
not least, I would like to thank the many wonderful faculty members in the Urban and Regional
Planning Department who offered hours of support and guidance throughout this process.

ii

Table of Contents

Abstract

v

Chapter I: Introduction

1

Chapter II: Theoretical and Policy Framework

4

Theoretical Background and Framework

4

Growth Management and Public Policy

8

Farmland Preservation and Growth Management Tools

15

Background on Transfer of Development Rights Programs

23

Factors Influencing the Success of TDR Programs

29

TDR Obstacles and Limitations

34

Chapter III: The Virginia Context

39

Planning in Virginia

43

Background on TDR in Virginia

44

Chapter IV: Research Design and Methodology

53

Study Area and Sample Selection

53

Methodology

54

Data Analysis

60

Chapter V: Results and Discussion

63

Urbanization and Development Pressures

iii

65

Land Preservation and Growth Management Goals

67

Socio-economic Characteristics and Comprehensive Plan Goals

68

Growth Management and Land Preservation Tools

77

Localities with a TDR Program on in the Process/Considering a TDR Program

86

Localities Not Considering Establishing a TDR Program

90

Socio-economic Characteristics and TDR Program Adoption

94

Coordination Among Localities

97

Success Factors and Obstacles for TDR Programs

99

Additional Comments Regarding TDR in Virginia

102

Political Structure and Support

102

Chapter VI: Conclusions

103

Conclusions

105

List of References

111

Appendix 1

120

iv

Abstract

IS TDR IN VIRGINIA DOA? A STUDY OF THE STATE OF TRANSFER OF
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS IN VIRGINIA
Alissa Marie Akins, Master of Urban and Regional Planning
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Urban
and Regional Planning at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012
Director: Dr. Avrum J. Shriar, Associate Professor, Urban Studies and Planning

Transfer of development rights has been approved as a tool to manage growth in Virginia since
2006, yet it has not been widely employed. This tool can be used to direct growth and
development at little or no cost to society while simultaneously preserving land for future
generations. In an effort to understand the limited use of transfer of development rights programs
in Virginia, this research collected information regarding obstacles and limitations to TDR
program development and implementation, from every locality in the Commonwealth authorized
to employ this tool. Based on findings of pertinent TDR literature, this research outlines the
environment in which policy in Virginia is being developed as well as obstacles and limitations
facing localities in developing TDR ordinances. Findings show that localities perceive several
obstacles to program implementation and that certain socio-economic characteristics may have
an impact on TDR program development in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

v

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

Facing growth pressures that are higher than the national average, the Commonwealth of
Virginia needs to rethink its approach to managing growth and development. Growth
management is important to preserve land, avoid sprawl, decrease infrastructure costs, and create
more livable communities. However, conventional zoning regulations may not be adequate to
preserve land and manage growth. The Code of Virginia authorizes and advises the use of
several tools to help manage growth and development throughout the state, yet localities rely
heavily on only a select few. Of the tools authorized by the Code of Virginia to manage growth,
this research determined that special exception permits are used by a majority of localities in the
state. Unfortunately, special exception permits are not part of a long-term, comprehensive
planning strategy, but a piecemeal approach that results in a locality undertaking reactive
measures to manage growth.
Several other tools authorized by the state code are significantly more proactive. Not only
can these tools help guide growth and development, but they can also help preserve land, plan
future growth, and create communities in which people want to live. Transfer of development
rights (TDR) is one of these tools, however it is used only by two localities. Transfer of
development rights programs result in more compact growth patterns by guiding community
growth to areas that have been previously designated and sited for growth potential. Transfer of
development rights programs operate a private market exchange of development rights and
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preserve land at little or no cost to the community. Transfer of development rights programs
involve the separation of the development rights from one parcel of land that can later be
attached to another, different parcel of land. Land a community wishes to preserve is called the
sending area and land planned for increased density is called the receiving area. The owner of the
development rights can gain compensation either by using the rights to build at a higher density
in the receiving area or by selling the rights to a developer who wishes to build at a higher
density in the designated receiving area. No new development rights accrue with the land in the
sending area and the land remains preserved in perpetuity. Successful programs have a high
degree of political and community support, properly designated sending areas, and well-sited
receiving areas. Furthermore, successful programs have strict zoning in the sending area and
offer few or no alternatives to TDR.
Two features that distinguish transfer of development rights programs from other growth
management and land preservation tools are that it provides compensation to land owners and
preserves land in perpetuity. Unlike tools that manage growth in a piecemeal fashion by
responding to individual requests for density increases, transfer of development rights works in
conjunction with comprehensive planning and takes a proactive approach to preserving land and
managing growth.
This research sought to understand why localities in Virginia are not using transfer of
development rights programs to manage growth and development. I contend that transfer of
development right programs would not only help preserve large tracts of land in the state, but
also direct growth to create more livable communities. Transfer of development rights can help a
locality undertake more proactive planning. Rather than tackling growth concerns in a piecemeal
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manner, transfer of development rights programs can offer a more comprehensive and holistic
approach to planning in Virginia.
The second chapter of this thesis outlines the theoretical and policy framework that laid
the foundations for my research and informed my methodology and data analysis. It also
includes an overview of farmland preservation and growth management tools and background on
transfer of development rights programs. The third chapter outlines the Virginia context and
explains the development of TDR legislation in Virginia, current programs, and any obstacles to
program development. The research design and methodology chapter explains how the research
was conducted and how the results were tabulated and analyzed. The chapter on results and
discussion outlines survey results and develops an in-depth discussion of how these results relate
to findings of previous TDR and growth management research. And finally, the conclusions
chapter entails a set of policy recommendations for planners and policymakers in the
Commonwealth of Virginia to help strengthen the current TDR legislation and increase the use
of transfer of development rights as a proactive tool to manage growth and preserve land.
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CHAPTER II – THEORETICAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Theoretical Background and Framework
Pragmatic Rationality
Rational planning and pragmatic rationality frame the structure and methodology of this
project. Rational planning has long been the dominant paradigm in planning practice. This model
assumes that, with perfect knowledge of every factor in a given situation, one can employ pure
rationality in decision-making (Brooks 2002). However, since this type of rationality is
impossible, pragmatic rationality becomes the default approach employed by planners. This
involves applying foresight and intelligence in an attempt to solve problems that shape our
future. Under pure rationality, consensus and agreement are reached through data collection and
empirical measurement, but pragmatic rationality operates through value-centered reasoning and
understanding. It assumes that planning is not value neutral and that “…truth cannot be
understood outside of the sociological and psychological processes and the community which
make truth possible…” (Verma 1996: 10). Pragmatic rationality is value-based rationality,
through which truth is not determined by data, rather by the data as viewed in the community in
which it operates. The same data may be interpreted differently and because of this, “…there is
little that can be regarded as independent of the community’s conception of what is true of false”
(Verma 1996: 10).
Furthermore, according to Flyvbjerg (1998, 2002), power dominates rationality in the
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dynamic relationship between the two. “Power does not limit itself, however, to simply defining
a given interpretation or view of reality, nor does power entail only the power to render a given
reality authoritative. Rather, power defines, and creates, concrete physical, economic, ecological,
and social realities” (Flyvbjerg 1998: 320). Thus, power defines what constitutes reality and
because of this, certain myths may persist, even when they are not factually true (Flyvbjerg
1998; Flyvbjerg 2002). Pragmatic rationality is important to this project since it assumes policy
creation takes place within a given social, economic, political and cultural context. Any
information gathered through this research cannot be viewed as independent of the context to
which it relates.

Systems Theory
The systems theory of public policy may help explain why TDR programs have not been
more widely adopted in Virginia as it relates to why a given policy is, or is not, adopted. Easton
(1957) states that political life is a system of activity in which there are important consequences
to society, which he terms outputs (political decisions). Inputs are cycled into the system and
lead to outputs. “These inputs are converted by the process of the system into outputs and these,
in turn, have consequences both for the system and the environment in which the system exists”
(Easton 1957: 384). The inputs into the political systems are of two types: demands and support.
Easton (1957) states that the reason a political system emerges at all is because demands are
being made by a person or group in society that are not fully satisfied. Implicit in this model
then, is the assumption that policies are made in response to demands. Support, on the other
hand, is generated in two ways, through outputs that meet demand and through the process of
politicization. In this way, outputs become inputs into the political system and the system
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becomes self-reinforcing and self-regulating. Thus, inputs into the political system, whether
supports or demands, affect the outputs from the political system, in this case policy, which in
turn leads to more or new inputs and the system keeps functioning in a cyclical manner.

Figure 1: “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems” Adapted from Easton (1957)
Systems theory assumes that the environment creates supports and demands, but the
environment may consist of many variables including varying socio-economic factors. This
theory attempts to understand preferences and the influence competing demands can have on
outputs. “If no one desires that a new policy be made, it will not be made; or, if no one wants an
operative policy changed, it will not be changed. Policy outputs will not be produced in the
absence of preferences” (Weber and Shaffer 1972: 684). Furthermore, “…systems approaches
can also be usefully employed as a way of generating distinctive analytical and implementation
strategies from which policy-makers can fashion policy recommendations” (Stewart and Ayers
2001: 91). In the absence of demands or preferences, no change will be made and the status quo
will remain the operative situation. Weber and Shaffer (1972) contend that indicators of opinionpolicy responsiveness could be employed to explain why some state policy-makers are
6

responsive to public opinion and others are not. This, they say, could “…go a long way in aiding
political science in understanding the influence of the political process upon policy-making”
(Weber and Shaffer 1972: 699).
Systems theory postulates that “[r]ather than selecting instruments to fit a particular kind of
policy problem (the conventional approach to policy design) systems analysis suggests that the
nature of the problem cannot be understood separately from its solution. Policy responses cannot
therefore be 'designed,' but represent a way of navigating through the problem” (Stewart and
Ayers 2001: 83). This theory assumes the interconnectedness of the component issues and
players; the idea is that no one issue has a direct cause or solution and that every outcome is an
input in a constantly evolving system. Furthermore, this theory suggests that researchers treat
systems as wholes, composed of related parts (Stewart and Ayers 2001). Stewart and Ayers
(2001) propose that for complex policy problems, such as those concerned with environmental
management and regulation, systems concepts offer a way to rationalize aspects of existing
practice and suggest directions for improvement.
A key insight from this theory is that the same end goals can be reached in numerous
ways; there is no one right course of action to achieve desired results. Similarly, the same course
of action may not always produce the same results. “A systems perspective would see
options…as a way of identifying a package of actions consistent with the desired end-state of the
system, its structural characteristics, and the values of those working within it” (Stewart and
Ayers 2001: 88). Clearly then, the environment in which a political system exists, the demands
being made and the preferences expressed will have an effect on the outputs generated and on
any future inputs into the political system.
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Growth Management and Public Policy
Policy is implemented at many levels and growth management decisions have largely
been left to local governments, with the exception of a few states (e.g. Florida and Maryland)
that have statewide growth management policies. Since few states have statewide growth
management policies and the federal government has a weak, if not non-existent, role in growth
management, the importance of sub-state governments in regulating growth and preserving land
has become critical. Two primary county level issues make policymaking at the county level
essential (Steel and Lovrich 2000). First, counties deal with the contrasts between less developed
agricultural areas and more densely developed population centers. Secondly, county
governments are where state governments generally implement public policy. While not much
research has been conducted concerning the role of local governments in growth management
policymaking decisions, some public policy literature stresses the importance of the county as a
political unit in growth management decisions (Steel and Lovrich 2000; Lubell, Feiock and
Ramirez 2005).
Counties are crucial in policymaking because they have been tasked with comprehensive
planning and have a high degree of discretion in policy implementation. Local governments
traditionally used comprehensive plans and regulatory tools to manage growth, but rising social
and environmental costs associated with increased growth have led to the development of other
tools (Bengston, Fletcher and Nelson 2004). “Counties are characterized by unique legal
distinctions not applicable to many other local governments” (Feiock and Taveras 6). The
authority granted to counties, however, is often quite limited and in nearly half the states,
including Virginia, counties operate under Dillon’s Rule and thus can exercise only those powers
expressly granted to them or necessarily implied.
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County governments can be classified into three general types: commission only,
commission/administrator, and the council-executive government (Feiock and Taveras). The
commission only government is the traditional, unreformed structure whereby an elected
commission executes both legislative and executive powers. Elected commissions are generally
more heavily involved in daily operations. Reformed forms of government include the
commission-administrator and the commission-mayor. The commission/administrator form of
government grants legislative authority to the commission or council, but also employs an
appointed county manager or administrator to manage the county’s daily operations. The elected
executive form of government is employed by many large, urban areas and consists of a
separation of powers where the elected officers generally have greater decision-making abilities
(Feiock and Taveras). Most cities currently use the council-manager or mayor-council form of
government.
The state of Virginia, however, features several more distinct classifications of local
government. These alternative forms of government consist of: county executive, county
manager form, urban county executive, county manager plan, county board and traditional
(Department of Housing and Community Development 2006). All cities in Virginia rely on the
council-manager form of government, except the City of Richmond, which now employs a
mayor-council form of government since 2004. Under the council-manager form of government,
the council elects a mayor from among its members. But in the City of Richmond, constituents
elect council members from their voting district and the citizens of the City elect the mayor in an
“at large” election (City of Richmond). Studies show that an elected mayor-commission form of
government is positively correlated with the adoption of growth management tools (Feiock
2004).
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Policy Instrument Selection: Politics, Community Characteristics and Growth Management
Growth management decisions are political choices (Feiock and Taveras) that result from
divergent interests and objectives among various groups and community members working to
promote the collective good in which they share (Molotch 1976; Logan 1978; Godschalk 1992;
Feiock 2004). “These interests encompass those seeking economic gain from development as
well as those seeking to promote environmental values, engage in social exclusion or protect
their quality of life” (Feiock, Tavares and Lubell 2008: 461). Growth controls, therefore, can be
viewed as exclusionary (Bollens 1990; Molotch 1976). A political market framework (Feiock,
Taveras and Lubell 2008; Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez 2005; Lubell, Feiock and de la Cruz 2009)
helps conceptualize policy adoption at the local level as a result of a mediated process between
suppliers of specific instruments for managing growth (i.e. government and political institutions)
and demanders of more or less growth in a community (i.e. citizens and other private interests).
Analogous to systems theory, this mediated process occurs in an environment composed of
various political institutions and socioeconomic characteristics.
The public policy literature concerning growth management theorizes that community
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and local demand, preferences and growth
pressures, affect the adoption of growth management tools among local governments (Baldassare
and Protash 1982; Feiock and Taveras; Steel and Lovrich 2000). Growth management tools can
be market-based or regulatory. Market-based tools use compensation, incentives, or disincentives
to regulate growth. Examples of market-based tools include incentive zoning, impact fees and
transfer of development rights. The most widely employed growth management strategies are
regulatory approaches and include tools such as zoning and comprehensive plan restrictions on
land use and urban service boundaries (Feiock and Taveras).
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Racially homogenous communities with a high per capita income and high levels of
educational attainment are more likely to adopt growth management or land conservation
policies (Molotch 1976; Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez 2005; Feiock, Taveras and Lubell 2008),
specifically market based tools (Feiock and Taveras; Feiock 2004). On the other hand, diverse,
more densely populated and less affluent areas are less likely to adopt growth control
regulations. This may be true because more educated populations understand the adverse effects
of sprawl, are less preoccupied with other problems, and are likely to support growth
management (Feiock, Taveras and Lubell 2008). Education may also lead to a more stable job,
the ability to own a home and a vested interest in maintaining community character.
Furthermore, suburban areas have historically been populated by more affluent, white citizens
and protecting the character of their community may be paramount (Feiock 2004). Additionally,
areas with healthy economies, including low rates of unemployment, are more likely to adopt
growth management tools than cities where unemployment is high (Steel and Lovrich 2000).
Economically disadvantaged counties are reluctant to adopt policies that would restrict economic
activity. Since TDR is driven by similar motivations as other growth management tools, the
literature indicates that TDR is more common in counties that are affluent, better educated and
racially homogenous (Feiock and Tavares; Feiock, Tavares and Lubell 2008). Higher levels of
poverty and percentage black population are linked to a decreased likelihood that a county would
employ a TDR program. However, others (Bollens 1990; Gerber and Phillips 2003) assert that
demographic characteristics are not good predictors of community support or opposition for
growth management policy.
A strong relationship exists between urbanization fueled by rapid growth and the
adoption of growth management and land use policies (Steel and Lovrich 2000). Quickly
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growing areas create pressure to accommodate growth, which may result in “not in my
backyard” (NIMBY) issues and other controversies. Growing urban and suburban counties want
to pass the costs of infrastructure onto developers that benefit from growth (Steel and Lovrich
2000). Furthermore, counties with high growth rates may adopt growth management tools to
preserve social and environmental amenities that may be threatened by unrestrained growth
(Feiock, Taveras and Lubell 2008; Lubell, Feiock and de la Cruz 2009). Environmental
amenities can greatly affect land values, particularly when land is scarce, and may be a
significant factor in growth management and land preservation decisions. As growth pressures
intensify, communities may begin to demand growth management policies to preserve
community character. Communities with lower population densities and abundant land feel little
threat to their community and way of life. While there is intrinsic value to undeveloped land,
many do not see this amenity until it is threatened by growth and development pressures.
Local politics also matters in growth management decisions. Every policy instrument has
political and distributive elements that make it more or less desirable to elected officials, interest
groups and individuals. Gerber and Phillips (2003) demonstrate that the decisions and strategies
of local political actors, including developers and interest groups, play a significant role in
shaping local land use and policy outcomes. Similarly, a number of studies (Steel and Lovrich
2000; Baldassare and Protash 1982) outline the importance of citizens and citizen groups in
growth management policy adoption. Citizen groups often provide the impetus to adopt growth
control measures at the local level and this local activism often results in the development of
growth controls. Local political institutional structure may help predict which interest group
preferences are reflected in local land use, growth control tools and development patterns
(Feiock and Taveras; Feiock 2004; Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez 2005; Feiock, Tavares and
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Lubell 2008; Lubell, Feiock and de la Cruz 2009). Political institutions will tend to support
different community interests and influence the ability of that interest to affect urban growth.
Some government structures are more susceptible to the influence of demand-side actors
(Feiock, Taveras and Lubell 2008). “Because growth controls are often exclusionary in nature,
local officials find it politically beneficial to adopt them to the benefit of local residents and
detriment of newcomers” (Feiock and Taveras). Furthermore, different institutional
arrangements will affect the response of political institutions to varying social and economic
conditions. Thus, “…the structure of local political institutions helps determine the winners and
losers in land-use policy” (Lubell, Feiock and de la Cruz 2009: 650). There exists, therefore, an
inherent political element underlying land use policy and growth management controls.
Research has found that the commission and elected executive form of government are
most responsive to popular demand and local pressures than the commission administrator
structure, and elected executives also tend to be more responsive to community activism (Feiock
and Taveras). Feiock, Tavares and Lubell (2008) found that communities that feature
commission-only government structures and low levels of business group activity most often
implement TDR programs. In contrast, the use of district representation was found to decrease
the likelihood of TDR adoption. “This may indicate representation of geographic interests in
local politics makes the type of exchanges and agreements necessary for TDR more difficult to
achieve” (Feiock and Taveras 19). Similarly, impact fees are most popular under commission
only forms of government (Feiock and Taveras) indicating that commission only forms of
government may be more inclined to adopt incentive or market based tools. Market-based tools,
such as incentive zoning, that shift the costs of new development off current residents, may be
favored by commission-administrator governments while more liberal communities may favor
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these policies because they are assumed to be less exclusionary (Feiock, Taveras and Lubell
2008). Others, however, find different results. The elected executive and commission
administrator forms of government are negatively related to impact fee adoption (Feiock and
Taveras). Furthermore, elected executive governments are more likely to adopt regulatory
approaches to growth management, according to Feiock and Taveras (p. 20), “[t]his governance
institution may offer different opportunity structures for local leaders and create incentives for
responsiveness to anti-growth interests.”
Elected mayor-commission forms of government are positively related to the adoption of
growth management tools (Feiock 2004). Mayors tend to embrace the preferences of wealthier
citizens, are more responsive to broad community interests and may favor pro-environmental
policies and oppose development and growth in wealthy communities (Lubell, Feiock and de la
Cruz 2009). Furthermore, as socioeconomic status increases, so too does the likelihood of
support from mayors regarding pro-environmental policies. While mayors favor the preferences
of higher socioeconomic classes, managers favor the preferences of the construction industry
(Lubell, Feiock and de la Cruz 2009). “The county-manager form of government is clearly
vulnerable to the politics of the growth machine, because managers respond to development
interests” (Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez 2005: 724). Others, however, do not agree. Steel and
Lovrich (2000) note that although county governments are crucial in growth management
decisions, government structures tend to have no influence on the adoption of growth control
mechanisms and elected executives are no more likely to adopt growth management tools than
commission or commission-administrator government structures.
The decision to adopt growth management tools is a complex decision weighing many
factors. Political institutional structure, community preferences and socioeconomic
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characteristics all underlie growth management decisions. These decisions are a mediated
process between demanders and suppliers in a given community or a particular environment in
which policy making occurs.

Farmland Preservation and Growth Management Tools
Growth in the form of new development is an inevitable outcome of increases in
population. The search for affordable, developable land has led to urban sprawl and extensive
encroachment into rural areas (Steel and Lovrich 2000). Urban sprawl creates a range of
challenges for environmental conservation, quality of life, urban revitalization and affordable
housing (Bengston, Fletcher and Nelson 2004). In an effort to decrease the negative social and
environmental effects of sprawl, the public sector, including local jurisdictions, has responded by
instituting policies to manage growth and protect open space from development (Steel and
Lovrich 2000; Bengston, Fletcher and Nelson 2004). Land preservation and growth management
are often perceived as mutually exclusive goals, however they are part of the same process and
the best way to preserve open space is to manage growth (Pfeffer and Lapping 1994). It follows
that a more holistic approach to managing growth and protecting open space is needed based on
a recognition that these two goals are not mutually exclusive.
Farmland preservation and growth management tools are closely related measures that
seek to achieve similar goals. While these tools vary in degree of protection, ease of
administration and their voluntary nature, both types of tools seek to preserve land susceptible to
development pressures and direct growth into areas designated to accommodate population
increase. In fact, “[o]ne of the most direct means to limit growth in rural/urban fringe areas is
farmland preservation…” (Pfeffer and Lapping 1994: 233). While farms and other agricultural
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activities in America may be facing pressures from urbanization, “[e]ven if active farming as an
economic activity is no longer profitable, conserving rural land uses may continue to provide
rural amenities that justify protection programs” (Heimlich and Anderson 2001: 44). Therefore,
even when farming is no longer profitable, there is intrinsic value to farmland that makes it
worthwhile to protect.
The literature on growth management tools divides them into two phases. First generation
policies, such as zoning and restrictions on residential construction, tend to have highly political
and distributive impacts and have been linked to increased housing prices (Feiock 2004). Second
generation policies include impact fees, growth boundaries and comprehensive plans. “To a great
extent, second-generation growth management tools are directed at sustaining the quality of life
in a community by adding costs to development” (Feiock 2004: 365). The literature further
divides farmland preservation and growth management tools into categories based on their use
and intent. Public policies for regulating growth and protecting open space are broken down into
three categories: public ownership and management, regulation and incentives (Bengston,
Fletcher and Nelson 2003).

Public Ownership
Public goods are assets that the market has failed to adequately supply and which can be
provided through public ownership. Non-exclusive property rights and indivisibility of
consumption characterize these assets, such that the use by one person does not, in theory,
decrease the amount available to others (Bengston, Fletcher and Nelson 2003). Some examples
include interstate highways and national defense. The provision of these goods is reflected in the
decision to benefit the general public and can be at the local, regional, state or national level.
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Regulatory Policy
These policy instruments are characterized by their obligatory nature (Bengston, Fletcher
and Nelson 2003). Regulatory approaches for managing growth are most often used at the local
level. Some examples include: urban growth boundaries (UGB), urban service boundaries
(USB), subdivision exactions, cluster zoning (sometimes also with incentives), downzoning or
large lot zoning, agricultural zoning, and concentrating rural development.
Agricultural zoning is the most common and least expensive measure to place restrictions
on land. Zoning of any type typically falls within the local government’s regulatory powers and
agricultural zoning is no exception. Several forms of agricultural zoning exist. Exclusive
agricultural zoning prohibits any use other than agricultural uses. The use of compatible
accessory buildings is however permitted. “…[S]upport for highly restrictive agricultural zoning
is more forthcoming in rural areas beyond the reach of heavy development pressures” (Arendt
1994: 295).
Another form of agricultural zoning allows residential or non-farm development but
severely limits density (Cordes 1999; Arendt 1994). This technique uses large minimum lot
requirements, effectively limiting the property to specifically agricultural uses. “Large lot zoning
simply requires that the minimum lot size in a designated rural zoning district is set at a large
enough size to protect agricultural activities from excessive encroachment of residential and
other non-agricultural land uses” (American Planning Association 2010: 24).
A less restrictive form of agricultural zoning is called Area Based Allocation Zoning,
cluster zoning, or Open Space Development Design, and can be used to require homes to be built
on smaller parcels of land. It increases overall density, but leaves significant tracts of land open
for farming or other green space. The number of house lots allowed is directly proportional to the
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total acreage the farmer owns. These lots, however, are subject to certain size restrictions and
may have to be located in a certain area of the property, perhaps where farming is the least viable
(Arendt 1994). “Besides helping to minimize the impact of new subdivisions on adjacent
agricultural uses, another virtue of low-density zoning is the opportunity it creates for other land
protection techniques to be applied” (Arendt 1994: 297). While this type of zoning may be less
restrictive, it can still serve the purpose of land preservation. Cluster zoning may also be
incentive-based; in return for providing a public good, a developer may be offered an incentive
such as increased density or increased floor area ratio (FAR).
Since a public restriction has been placed on the property, the landowner cannot sell the
land for nonagricultural uses even when development pressures become significant (Cordes
1999). Thus, because zoning can limit development, even with significant growth pressures and
financial incentives, it can be used as a farmland protection and growth management tool at the
local level.
Urban growth boundaries and urban service boundaries are not zoning designations, but
political designations established in a locality’s comprehensive plan. Since comprehensive plans
can designate areas to receive infrastructure extension, such as sewer and water, urban growth
boundaries guide decisions about rezoning applications and public infrastructure improvements
(American Planning Association 2010). These designations establish boundaries beyond which
infrastructure will not be extended and outside of which urban development will not occur.
“USBs [urban service boundaries] can be a powerful tool for restricting new development,
preserving public goods, minimizing fiscal burdens and negative externalities” (Feiock, Tavares
and Lubell 2008: 466). These designations can help localities avoid sprawl and leapfrog
development as well as promote mixed use and infill development. They can however result in
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higher housing costs because of land scarcity and a limited supply of developable land (Feiock,
Tavares and Lubell 2008).

Incentive –based Policy
Incentive-based policy instruments involve either incentives or disincentives using
monetary or non-monetary resources in exchange for the alteration of behavior (Bengston,
Fletcher and Nelson 2003). The literature also refers to these types of tools as market based
approaches (Feiock and Taveras). These policies are not mandatory, but may be widely
employed based on the incentive offered. And these techniques are thought to be less intrusive
than regulatory controls (Feiock and Taveras). Examples include: Right to farm (RTF) laws,
agricultural districts, transfer of development rights (TDR), purchase of development rights
(PDR), use-value taxation, impact fees, infill development incentives, and historic rehabilitation
tax credits.
Incentive zoning is a growth management and land preservation technique that allows
developers to build at higher densities in exchange for providing social and environmental
amenities to the community. Whereas traditional zoning strives to avoid negative externalities
between competing land uses, incentive zoning would produce amenities, such as parks, schools
and affordable housing, that would produce positive externalities (Feiock, Tavares and Lubell
2008). “This growth management technique is based on incentives because the price at which the
local government buys each amenity is the amount of bonus provided to the developer” (Feiock,
Tavares and Lubell 2008: 467).
Similarly, impact fees can be used to manage growth because they shift the cost burden
of new infrastructure development to developers (Feiock, Tavares and Lubell 2008). In these
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instances, the government does not absorb the cost increases associated with the infrastructure
and community facilities necessary to accommodate new development. Lowering impact fees
may encourage excessive development and raising the fees may result in more compact
development.
Every state currently has some form of tax relief provisions for agricultural land, the most
common of which are preferential-assessment statutes (Cordes 1999). These programs assess
land at a reduced value when used for agriculture. Deferred taxation programs provide lower
assessment for farmland but require partial or total repayment of the tax savings if the land is
later converted to other uses (Cordes 1999), thus giving the landowner an incentive to retain the
land as farmland. These tools provide financial incentives to farmers to offset potential benefits
gained from conceding to development pressures.
Another technique to aid the preservation of agricultural land is right to farm laws (RTF).
RTF laws provide some protection to farmers against nuisance complaints, stemming from
development that has moved to rural and agricultural areas and gets negatively affected by
farming and other activities typical of such areas (Cordes 1999). Zoning is meant to protect
nuisance operations from developing in adjacent areas, but rural areas often face great
development pressures. Perhaps the best way to minimize conflicts between new residents and
the farming community is to keep them physically separated (Arendt 1994). Right to farm laws
do not preserve land, but they do provide protection to farmers who want to continue farming in
the face of development and growth pressures from urban areas.
Similarly, agricultural districting involves the creation of voluntary agricultural districts
that require the land to be used only for agricultural purposes. The creation of agricultural and
forestal districts is permitted in the Code of Virginia (Section 15.2-43). As an incentive based
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preservation tool, landowners who participate in these districts receive benefits depending on the
regulation. “…[O]bservers criticize this approach as conferring too many benefits on farmers
without requiring any corresponding restrictions on their ability to convert their land into
sprawling low-density residential developments” (Arendt 1994: 291). These districts may help
retain land in agriculture, but do not in any way restrict or prevent the development of
agricultural land.
The voluntary nature of the aforementioned preservation tools can limit their
effectiveness. Cordes (1999: 7) notes that “[s]uch programs play an important role in a
comprehensive preservation program, but by themselves will often be ineffective in establishing
long-term farmland preservation.” Cordes (1999) further notes that since these voluntary
techniques are ineffective in farmland preservation, there is a need for programs that will restrict
a landowner’s ability to develop his land through techniques that place decision making authority
elsewhere, particularly with the government. However, localities may consider these tools forms
of exclusionary zoning, which limits the frequency with which these tools are employed. Thus,
preservationists have turned to other voluntary land use control programs such as purchase of
development rights (PDR) and compensatory zoning programs such as transfer of development
rights (TDR) (Pfeffer and Lapping 1994; Cordes 1999) that also function as growth control
mechanisms.
Purchase of development rights programs involve limiting the landowner’s development
potential and shifting the cost of preservation to the public by using public funds, from tax
revenue or state bonds, or an organization such as a land trust, to purchase the development
rights (Cordes 1999; Brabec and Smith 2002). Property owners relinquish the ability to develop
their property to more intensive, nonagricultural uses while the cost of preservation is placed on
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the public or non-profit organization through the purchase agreement (Cordes 1999). Typically,
purchase of development rights programs allow the government, or other entity such as a
nonprofit, to purchase the development rights on a piece of land by paying the landowner the
difference between the value of the property in its current agricultural state and the value of the
property in a developed state. Purchase of development rights programs can be extremely
expensive, particularly in states with agricultural zoning ordinances that allow residential
developments on small lot sizes (Arendt 1994). PDR programs, however, are effective at
retaining farmland as they maintain development restrictions on farmland in perpetuity. But,
“[s]ince the tool is voluntary on the part of the landowner, a PDR program does not hold the
inherent protection against fragmentation of a TDR program” (Brabec and Smith 2002: 257).
This is true because purchase of development rights programs preserve land one lot at a time
whereas transfer of development rights programs designate entire areas to be voluntarily
preserved. Under most TDR schemes, even when a landowner chooses not to enter into a binding
agreement, they are left with few options to develop their land and designated areas remain
wholly or largely undeveloped.
The cost of PDR programs makes them unfeasible on a large scale since most localities
do not possess sufficient funds to purchase large pieces of land. Transfer of development rights
programs circumvent this problem by transferring the cost burden from the local government to
private developers. As a farmland preservation tool, TDR can be used to keep the best and most
productive land from falling victim to development pressures. As a growth management tool,
TDR can direct growth to desired locations to avoid haphazard, sprawling development. Transfer
of development rights programs are discussed in more detail below.
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Both PDR and TDR are also less likely to falter in changing political climates where
strong development pressure might affect other more typical zoning techniques. Furthermore,
PDR and TDR programs “…internalize some of the social benefits that fall beyond the normal
boundary of the pricing system for agricultural land” (Duke and Aull-Hyde 2002: 132). Thus,
certain externalities not accounted for by the market are taken into account in these types of
farmland preservation measures. “To the extent economically feasible, PDRs, and if possible,
TDRs, should be used for two reasons. First, they admittedly address the perceived unfairness of
substantial drops in property value and make preservation more politically acceptable. Second,
they also are more likely to be effective in permanently restricting land to agricultural use rather
than agricultural zoning” (Cordes 2005: 203). These voluntary land use controls can be vital to
land preservation and growth management.

Background on Transfer of Development Rights Programs
Transfer of development rights is a technique used for many purposes in the United
States. It can be used for landmark preservation, open space preservation, preservation of
ecologically fragile resources, a tool to regulate land use, a tool to encourage construction of
moderate to low income housing, as a community growth regulatory measure, and to avoid
windfalls and wipeouts (increases or decreases in property values because of certain government
actions) (Rose 1975). This research will focus solely on the use of TDR as a tool to manage
community growth and development and preserve open space.
The primary goals of transfer of development rights programs are the preservation of
open space, environmentally sensitive lands, agricultural lands, historic buildings or housing, and
the achievement of compact, managed community growth (Lane 1998; Cohen and Preuss 2002;
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Pizor 1978). While these goals may seem contradictory, they are in fact, complementary.
Effectively, TDR involves shifting development potential from one area to another, a process
Shales (1974) refers to as “…the orderly reallocation of density…” (527). Transfer of
development rights programs can help alleviate growth and development pressures by preserving
valuable lands and directing growth to areas that can accommodate density increases. “Transfer
of development rights’…helps a community plan its growth. The net effect is preservation of
environmentally important areas with equitable compensation for owners” (Chavooshian and
Norman 1975: 403). Hanly-Forde et al. propose a third fundamental goal which is compensation
to landowners who lose or sell their right to develop property, in turn making the goal of
preservation not only more politically palatable but also more equitable. Compensation to land
owners, however, is an essential element of any TDR program that distinguishes it from other
land preservation measures. Since compensation it is not a desired or intended outcome, it will
not be considered a fundamental goal.
The inherent compensation mechanism of TDR programs suggests that TDR is an option
by which localities can preserve large areas of land at little to no cost to society as no
government acquisition is involved (Chavooshian and Norman 1975; Pizor 1978). Other methods
of land preservation such as land purchases and low-density zoning can be extremely costly or
remove land from the tax base. Transfer of development rights programs cost the government
and community little or nothing because they operate a private market exchange of development
rights between the sending area, the area a community wants to save and the receiving area, the
area designated for growth (Pfeffer and Lapping 2004; Pruetz 2003; Kaplowitz, Machemer and
Pruetz 2008). According to Pruetz (2003) TDR programs do not attempt to offset value
reductions for one property owner with value increases experienced by the same property owner.
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Instead, a proportion of the value created by increased development in receiving areas is the
source of compensation to landowners in a sending area who are willing to restrict development
on their land in perpetuity.
Transfer of development rights relies on the fact that property rights are not a monolithic,
unitary right, but a bundle of rights from which any one right may be separated from the others
(Hanly-Forde et al.; American Farmland Trust 2008; Woodbury 1975; Pizor 1978). This bundle
of rights can be translated into physical rights, including the right to build, farm and exploit
natural resources and other enforceable rights, such as the right to sell or rent the land, subdivide
the land, or even grant conservation easements, any of which are separable from the others
(Hanly-Forde et al.; Woodbury 1975). Under transfer of development rights, the right to develop
land is separated from the other land rights. In lieu of monetary compensation, landowners are
granted development rights which they can either use in designated receiving areas or sell, for
just compensation, to individuals or developers wishing to increase the scope or intensity of their
project, also in receiving areas. “In this way, elected officials are not faced with the unpopular
option of reducing the property values of constituents without offering compensation in return.
And TDR also avoids total reliance on fees, grants or taxes because development proceeds
supply the funding” (Pruetz 2003: 27). If a sending area landowner chooses to use the
development rights, they can gain compensation from the more intensive use of property
elsewhere. Sending area landowners can also sell their development rights to developers in
receiving areas allowing them to increase the scope or intensity of a project, and simultaneously
receive compensation for restricting their land rights (Strong, Mendelker and Kelly 1996).
Developers benefit from transfer of development rights programs because they are able to avoid
or exceed certain zoning regulations and avoid cumbersome, costly, and time-consuming
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variance requests (Hanly-Forde et al.). Other purchasers of development rights include local
governments that wish to control land prices, design details or restrict growth (Hanly-Forde et
al.).
Development in sending zones is either severely limited or completely prohibited. Under
TDR, sending area landowners can either convey the title of their land or place it in a
conservation easement (Pruetz 2003). In certain instances, the local government or a non-profit
may choose to purchase land outright thus gaining full title to the land. If a sending area
landowner wants to retain the title to his land, he may choose to place his property under an
easement. An easement would restrict development on the land in perpetuity. If an owner who
has sold their development rights then sells their land, the new owner inherits the easement. No
new development rights accrue with the land. If a property owner places his land in an
easement, compensation is granted through the sale of development rights that is equal to the
property’s full market value (Pruetz 2003). Effectively, the development value is the cost of
buying a conservation easement on the sending site (Pruetz 2003).
Transfer of development rights allocation rates can be based on many factors besides
market value. “Many communities allow the sale of one TDR for each dwelling that can be built
on the sending site under baseline zoning” (Pruetz 2003: 135). This is also known as the one-toone transfer ratio. If the sending area has been downzoned, some localities allocate development
rights based on the density allowed under the previous zoning. The development potential of the
sending area, in the form of development rights, is transferred to the receiving area where
property owners and developers are allowed to develop land at designated densities.
The receiving area, or zone of development potential, should have been previously
designated by the community and should be suitable to accommodate the desired level of growth
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for a given community. It generally is located adjacent to previously existing urban areas, though
it can be located anywhere designated by the locality. The receiving area must face development
demand for densities that are higher than what is currently allowed by right. “TDR programs
generally allow developers to build up to a predetermined density limit, called a TDR threshold,
without having to buy TDRs” (Pruetz 2003: 140). If a developer wishes to exceed the threshold,
he must purchase the number of development rights stipulated in the TDR ordinance (Pruetz
2003).
Comprehensive Planning, Zoning and TDR
Comprehensive plans are an important component in achieving a locality’s growth
management and land preservation goals and are thus crucial in the development and
implementation of TDR programs. “The comprehensive plan is the foundation for all decisionmaking in matters involving land use planning and growth management” (American Planning
Association 2010: 8). They outline long terms goals, objectives and implementation strategies.
Planning is used to account for changes in the locality to ensure that land and resources are being
used wisely, people have safe, healthy communities in which to live, future needs have been
accounted for and planning has taken into account the most cost-effective measures. Planners
play a key role in this process “…because they are charged with developing local land use plans
that reflect local interests. Planners must attempt to clearly identify significant local interests and
work to incorporate them into local planning initiatives…[and] attempt to articulate a community
vision of the future” (Pfeffer and Lapping 1994: 237). Transfer of development rights is a land
use tool and is not a substitute for comprehensive planning, but should be used in the context of
comprehensive planning and existing zoning within a locality (Hanly-Forde et al., Pfeffer and
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Lapping 1994; Pizor 1978). “TDR programs that are created within the context of a
comprehensive plan are much more likely to be tailored to the specific political, economic and
geographic circumstances of their location” (Lane 1998). Much like comprehensive planning,
TDR programs should be developed in combination with the community to ensure their specific
needs are met. Consequently, TDR programs work only when they are part of a larger, long-term
land use plan that has the commitment of politicians and the community to achieving its goals
(Lane 1998).
While comprehensive planning helps a locality plan its long-term growth and
development goals, zoning is a tool that can be used to manage growth and development.
Existing zoning decrees the permitted or allowable building density or a particular area.
Traditional zoning mechanisms, when left to market pressures, result in haphazard development
and scattered, non-contiguous parcels of open space and low-density, sprawling developments
(Chavooshian and Norman 1975; Woodbury 1975). These inherent problems with conventional
zoning have led to the development of more innovative zoning techniques that simultaneously
preserve open space and direct growth, such as planned unit developments (PUD). Transfer of
development rights, while not explicitly a zoning tool, can be used in conjunction with existing
zoning techniques. Others argue, however, that transfer of development rights can be used as a
substitute for traditional zoning regulations (Shales 1974). Some zoning regulations are regarded
as discriminatory and since TDR can be used to limit or restrict development and growth of a
locality, it may also be viewed as discriminatory or exclusionary, particularly if not used in
conjunction with comprehensive planning. TDR regulates and constrains growth but also
challenges unregulated growth by taking land off the market and rendering it unavailable for
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development purposes (Pfeffer and Lapping 1994). Just as it can pose a threat, however, it can
also aid this growth mechanism by enabling higher densities and more compact development.

Factors Influencing the Success of TDR Programs
A significant amount of research has been conducted on TDR programs in the United
States, specifically in areas with highly successful programs, such as Montgomery County,
Maryland and the Pinelands in New Jersey. Many of these studies have focused on factors that
contribute to program success or lack thereof. The features of successful programs have been
derived from relevant TDR literature (e.g. Pizor 1986; Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002; Fulton et
al. 2004; Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz 2008; Pruetz and Standridge 2009). While it is clear
that there are many factors that can influence the success of a TDR program, drawing on the
work of Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz (2008) this research postulates that those factors that
can have the greatest effect are under the influence of planners, policy makers and local
government officials.

TDR Bank
The existence of a TDR bank in successful programs has been supported in the literature
(Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz 2008; Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002; Fulton et al. 2004;
Lane 1998; Pruetz and Standridge 2009). TDR banks are government entities that use public
funds to buy development rights and hold them for resale to developers. Along with providing
certain key functions, such as facilitating transactions, promoting the TDR program and
providing prospective landowners and developers with information regarding the value of
development rights credits, a TDR bank can also provide supportive functions such as marketing
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the program, acting as a facilitator and educator to the community and providing credibility for
and confidence in the TDR program.

Political Foundations
Strong political foundations can provide the groundwork for communities to initiate and
implement successful TDR programs. While this foundation may vary from effective state
enabling legislation to more general police power (Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002), without
proper legislation in the form of a state or local ordinance, a community may be susceptible to
legal challenges. Effective state enabling legislation may be important to establishing clear legal
authority but the legislation should be specific enough to provide clear guidance yet broad
enough to enable localities to tailor their programs to local circumstances (Lane 1998). In
addition, strong political leadership and leadership within stakeholder groups, is necessary for
program success (Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002).

Community Support
The nature of TDR programs requires community support to encourage both sending area
landowners and receiving area developers to participate in the program. Community support is
crucial to TDR program success (Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002; Fulton et al. 2004; Pruetz and
Standridge 2009). Public support is important for ensuring that requests for exceptions to TDR
requirements do not affect the program’s effectiveness (Pruetz and Standridge 2009). The
unwavering support of the community and all parties involved is vital to withstand these
pressures and ensure the success of any TDR program.
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Additionally, TDR programs that operate concurrently with PDR programs are more
successful than programs that operate in the absence of PDR programs (Machemer and
Kaplowitz 2002; Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz 2008; Pruetz and Standridge 2009). Both of
these programs illustrate the community’s commitment to preservation, however, most localities
do not possess the necessary funds to use PDR as a land preservation technique to achieve
desired preservation goals. Communities with a strong sense of place that can appreciate the
benefits of directing growth to receiving areas and preserving sending areas, will have more
successful TDR programs (Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002).

Background Studies and Local Knowledge
Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz (2008) found a statistically significant relationship
between TDR programs that conducted background studies prior to initiating the program and
the success of the TDR program. These studies investigate different options and alternatives to
TDR programs and represent a commitment of time and resources on the part of the community
to establishing a TDR program and achieving desired preservation goals. Knowledge of local
land use patterns and demand are vital to the success of a TDR program since there must be
demand where TDR will be used (Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002).

Program Simplicity
Well structured programs, with clear goals and simple conditions and transfer policies
tend to be more successful (Pizor 1986; Kaplowitz and Machemer 2002; Pruetz and Standridge
2009). “A program’s simplicity helps it build support among the diverse groups that are potential
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supporters…” (Pruetz and Standridge 2009: 85). Simplicity can not only help build public
support, but also encourage participation and balance supply and demand.

Encouraging Participation and Balancing Supply and Demand
Demand may not automatically exist in the market for development rights. Planners and
policy makers can encourage demand for TDR. TDR programs in and around communities under
high growth pressures tend to feature higher demand and preserve a greater number of acres
(Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002; Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz 2008). Many TDR programs
fail because developers are satisfied with the density they get for free under current zoning
regulations. “…[I]t is understandable that landowners are not likely to think they should ‘buy
what they can get for free’” (Fulton et al. 2004: 22). Communities that approve upzonings should
also require the purchase of development rights. “Regulatory consistency sends the signal that
TDR sending area zoning will not change and that bonus densities in receiving areas will only be
achieved through TDR participation…” (Machemer and Kalpowitz 2002: 784). Similarly,
offering few or no alternatives to participating in TDR programs can also encourage participation
in these programs (Pruetz and Standridge 2009).

Designating and Regulating Sending Areas
Many areas try to preserve land that is most directly threatened by development. Sending
areas must be properly chosen to avoid high transaction costs, too much development pressure,
and leapfrog development. “Land under immediate threat of development will typically have a
high development value, forcing high TDR allocation rates in an attempt to motivate owner
participation” (Fulton et al. 2004: 22-23). Land that is located too close to urbanizing areas may
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be susceptible to growth and development pressures. These landowners may be inclined to sell
their land directly to developers instead of selling their development rights. In this case, the cost
of the transferable development rights will increase greatly to ensure the land is not developed
and set an unsustainable precedent for future sales of development rights. If sending areas are
poorly chosen, “leapfrog development” may occur, in which a locality preserves land too close to
developed areas causing growth to occur beyond the preserved area and extend farther from the
city center. Additionally, sending areas need to have strict zoning regulations since the purpose
of sending area zoning is to implement the community’s preservation goals (Pruetz and
Standridge 2009). Furthermore, sending areas should be strictly zoned and offer few or no
alternatives to participating in TDR programs.

Sustainable and Appropriate Receiving Areas
Receiving areas should be customized to fit local needs and remain viable (Pruetz and
Standridge 2009; Fulton et al. 2004; Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002). Receiving areas should be
well sited and prepared for development, including provisions for infrastructure (Pizor 1986).
“Ideally, TDRs are transferred from rural areas into cities on the urban fringe, where the
infrastructure, employment, shopping, and public services…already exists” (Pruetz and
Standridge 2009: 82). If no feasible area currently exists, it is possible for communities to design
new receiving areas. “In many cases, communities designate too few receiving areas or the TDR
program cannot withstand political opposition from neighbors in receiving areas (Fulton et al.
2004: 22). TDR receiving sites must be feasible from both a planning and political standpoint.
The area must be able to accommodate growth but also be defensible by local politicians who
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may face backlash from their constituents. Most importantly however, receiving areas should be
tailored to local needs, which can be done through proper policy and planning.
It is clear that there are many factors present in successful TDR programs. What is more
evident is that none of these factors exists independent of the others. The above list details
elements of existing, successful programs, but it also provides insight into factors that can hinder
or advance the development and implementation of new programs. Those elements under the
influence of planners and policy makers are of particular interest in this study. While it is clear
that the program must be designed to meet the needs of the community and local environment
(Pizor 1986), many elements of successful programs are those over which planners and policy
makers have the most control (Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz 2008). Planners and policy
makers can act as educators, facilitators, managers and problem solvers while at the same time,
developing policies and programs that achieve goals and encourage mutual understanding and
participation in TDR programs. None of these activities, however, occur in a vacuum and the
environment in which planning takes place ultimately affects the policies that are adopted. The
social, economic and political climate of a locality can have important implications for the
adoption of land preservation and growth management tools.

TDR Obstacles and Limitations
Although transfer of development rights programs can overcome many of the challenges
of other farmland preservation mechanisms, these programs are not without limitations
themselves. The TDR literature documents prominent and pressing challenges to developing
successful TDR programs and highlights some of the limitations of TDR as a planning tool.
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Regional Planning
A lack of regional planning can limit the effectiveness of farmland preservation
programs, particularly when used as land-use mechanisms in rapidly urbanizing areas (Pfeffer
and Lapping 1994). In the absence of regional cooperation, the problem of “leapfrog”
development may be more acute. While it is possible for development rights transfers to occur
across jurisdictional lines, in the absence of regional planning and regional cooperation transfers
are most likely to occur only within a single municipality.

Program simplicity
Creating a program that is simple enough to understand but complex enough to be fair
can be a major obstacle (Lane 1998). Adequate staff with appropriate knowledge of how TDR
programs work is vital to the creation of successful programs. Simple programs can encourage
participation, but they may also incite confusion and frustration as well as discourage landowners
or developers from participating. Finding a proper balance between simple, easy to understand
programs and programs that are complex enough to be fair, can be a challenge.

Community Acceptance
As suggested by Rose (1975) TDR programs may evoke a type of intellectual
xenophobia, or fear of a stranger, on the part of planners, government officials and the
community. Furthermore, developing support among community members to ensure the use of
TDR programs can be a challenge. Many communities have difficulty accepting increased
density in the receiving area (Lane 1998) because of the effects it may have on the community
and neighboring landowners. The effects on adjacent landowners are multifold. “…[L]and-use
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controls protect neighboring property owners and residents at the same time they restrict the
owner of a particular piece of property” (Strong, Mendelker and Kelly 1996: 15). Residents of
receiving areas might be more receptive to the concept of denser development if they were
presented with models and drawings of what development under traditional zoning would look
like. “…[T]he general public and the marketplace do not value centered development” (Lane
1998). Developing community support can be a challenge, but once established, it can contribute
to the success of a program.

Economics: Developing a Market and Motivating Buyers and Sellers
The economics behind operating a TDR program can be a challenge. Establishing a local
market for development rights gives the development rights value and provides an incentive for
their transfer (Woodbury 1975; Strong, Mendelker and Kelly 1996; Lane 1998). Not only do
planners have to ensure the existence of a market for development rights, but buyers and sellers
must both be motivated to partake in the program. Establishing a fair and just means to allocate
development rights to landowners wishing to sell their rights, can be a concern when motivating
sellers. Furthermore, developers must be required to purchase development rights in order to
build and since their project may be within the scope of current zoning regulations, there is no
incentive for them to purchase development rights otherwise (Strong, Mendelker, Kelly 1996).

Avoiding Legal Challenges
Avoiding litigation can be an obstacle to successful TDR programs (Lane 1998; Pizor
1978). TDR programs compensate landowners for the sale of their development rights, however
a takings claim may arise. The takings clause states that government action cannot deny a

36

landowner of reasonable economic use of his land. According to Pizor (1978), the
accommodation doctrine provides that compensation would only need to be made if the land
value fell below its reasonable and beneficial use. However, reasonable and beneficial use has no
standard definition in the courts and determining a fair price and just compensation for
landowners can be difficult.

Proper Implementation Mechanisms
Proficient planners and a capable, responsible governing body are key to successful TDR
programs (Rose 1975). A lack of understanding and support on either side can be severe
limitations. Both parties play crucial roles in the development and implementation of TDR
programs. Planners can project future market demand as well as designate sites as sending and
receiving areas. The governing body must be strong enough to uphold the recommendations
made by planners and withstand any political pressure or opposition. “To the extent that either
group falters, the program may be jeopardized” (Rose 1975: 20). Thus, without competent
planners and a responsible governing body, TDR programs will likely not be successful.

Permanence
While the permanence of TDR may be considered a benefit to protecting open space and
farmland in a community or region, some find that it “…limits the future options of a community
as societal values and community characteristics shift” (Hanly-Forde et al.). Areas under intense
growth pressures may turn to TDR to protect valuable farmland and open space however, they
are also limiting any future development and may inadvertently be contributing to leap-frog
development and sprawling growth patterns as growth will move farther and farther from the city
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center. The permanence of growth controls and land preservation tools can be beneficial if
appropriate sending and receiving areas have been designated.
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CHAPTER III – THE VIRGINIA CONTEXT

Agriculture and forestry have historically been extremely important activities in Virginia.
Forests and open space can generate income, clean the air and water, and provide recreation and
scenic beauty. Currently, forests are the single most important land use in the state, covering
62% of the total land area (Virginia Department of Environmental Quality; Virginia Department
of Forestry), followed by agriculture, the second most intensive land use. As of 2007, Virginia
had 8,103,925 acres of farmland (Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services),
including 3,274,137 acres of cropland (U.S. Census of Agriculture). According to the Virginia
Department of Forestry, two thirds of all forested land in the state is owned by private
landowners and 17% is publicly owned in two national forests, seventeen state forests and
Shenandoah National Park. Overall, 89% of Virginia’s land consists of either forests or is under
agriculture or pasture. Other land use and cover types include wetlands, residential, water,
commercial, and transitional land uses (Virginia Department of Environmental Quality).
Agriculture also accounts for a significant amount of the state’s economy. In fact,
agriculture is the largest industry in Virginia, accounting for approximately 357,000 jobs and an
economic impact of $55 billion annually (Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services). However, agriculture and forestry related industries combined make up just over 10%
of the total employment for the state of Virginia (Rephann 2008). In the period from 1960 to
2007, Virginia lost more than five million acres of farmland (Virginia Department of Agriculture
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and Consumer Services). Forestland is decreasing as well. The Virginia Department of Forestry
estimates that since 2001, 64% of the deforested area was cleared for urban development. Loss
of land to development between the period 1982-2007 is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1: Loss of land to development, 1982-2007
Agricultural land
converted to
developed land (acres)

Prime Agricultural Land
Converted to Developed
Land (acres)1

Rural land
converted to
developed land
(acres)

Prime rural land
converted to
developed land
(acres)

462,300

185,800

1,275,400

356,800

Source: Farmland Information Center (2006); Total surface area 27,087,100 acres

Virginia is facing phenomenal growth pressures. According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
as of 2010, the population of Virginia was 8,001,024, an increase of 13% from 2000, higher than
the national average over the same period (Table 2). As of 2010, an astounding 72.2% of the
population of Virginia lived in high-density, urban areas, an increase of 3.3% since 2000
(Virginia Performs). In 1945, there were 211,000 acres of urban land in the commonwealth and
by 2007 that number had increased to 1,555,000 acres (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2012).
Although a majority of the population lives in high-density areas, the amount of land consumed
by high-density areas makes up only 3.7% of the total land area of the Commonwealth (Virginia
Performs). However, in 2010, Virginia had only 2.5 residents per developed acre, down from 3.0
in 1982 (Virginia Performs), indicating less efficient land use patterns and more dispersed,
sprawling suburban development. More residents per acre suggests more compact, efficient land
use with less land consumed in sprawling, suburban developments.

1

Prime agricultural land is defined as land with the best physical and chemical characteristics to
produce food, feed and oilseed crops and is available for these uses (Farmland Information
Center 2007).
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Table 2: Population Trends, 2000-2010
2000
2010
% change (2000-2010)

US
281,421,906
308,745,538
9.70%

Virginia
7,078,515
8,001,024
13.00%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau – QuickFacts 2010

This growth in population and land consumption has had tremendous impacts on
localities around the state. Between the period of 1990-2000, 45 counties, six cities and 45 towns
in Virginia had population growth rates of 15% or higher (American Planning Association 2010).
Furthermore, there were 12 counties, six cities and 25 towns with populations of at least 20,000
and a growth rate of 5% between 1990 and 2000. These extreme growth pressures led the
Commonwealth to mandate Urban Development Area (UDA) requirements. This requirement
states that any county or city meeting the requirements mandated by the state must designate at
least one Urban Development Area to be included in their comprehensive plan by July 2011
(county) or July 2012 (city). A UDA is an area that is appropriate for higher density development
that is near transportation facilities, public service infrastructure and currently developed areas.
The UDA must incorporate principles of Traditional Neighborhood Design (TND) including
commercial and residential densities specified in the legislation. Finally, the UDA should
accommodate growth for at least 10 years, with potential boundary revisions every five years
(American Planning Association 2010).
The extreme importance of agriculture and forestry, combined with considerable growth
pressures, has also led to a surge in land preservation. The Virginia Department of Conservation
and Recreation estimates that 3.74 million acres, or 14.8% of the total land area of Virginia, had
been protected as of August 2011. Of this total, the Virginia Outdoors Foundation, an
organization dedicated to land conservation, has protected 622,707 acres through conservation
easements since 1968 (Virginia Outdoors Foundation 2011). Conservation easements are held by
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federal, state, local and private entities. The total acres conserved by these groups are represented
in Table 3.
In 2011, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to establish the Virginia
Farmland Preservation Fund. This fund would receive money from the General Assembly as well
as public and private sources and would be used to finance actions of the Office of Farmland
Preservation in Virginia established by the General Assembly in 2001 to help reverse the loss of
farmland to development. The Office of Farmland Preservation performs many functions
including establishing policies and practices to guide local PDR programs and determining
sources of funding for localities to purchase agricultural easements. Furthermore, the Office of
Farmland Preservation is charged with assisting localities in developing other farmland
preservation policies and programs and educating the public about the importance of these
programs. To date, the Office of Farmland Preservation has used state matching funds to help
protect 1,000 acres of farm and forestland (Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services). This legislation clearly illustrates that Virginia is strongly dedicated to preserving
farmland. While a limited amount of farmland has been protected, this dedication to preservation
goals should not go unnoticed.
Table 3: Conservation Lands in Virginia
Group

Totals

Acres Conserved

Percent of Total

Federal

2,340,510.36

62.59%

State

1,053,625.88

28.18%

Local

135,602.33

3.63%

Private

209,488.46

5.60%

3,739,227.02

100.00%

Source: Virginia Department of Recreation and Conservation, 2011
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Planning in Virginia
Virginia has a long history of planning that can be traced to the English settlement in
Jamestown over four hundred years ago (American Planning Association 2010). In order to
achieve planning goals, localities in the state are required by the Code of Virginia to prepare and
adopt a comprehensive plan to show the long-range recommendations for general development
patterns (Code of Virginia Sec. 15.2-2223; American Planning Association 2010). The Code of
Virginia identifies and authorizes four primary tools available to communities in order to carry
out and implement local comprehensive plans. These tools include the official map, subdivision
regulations, zoning, and capital improvements programs (American Planning Association 2010).
There are a number of other tools derived from, or supplementary to, these identified tools,
including form based codes, large lot or agricultural zoning, cluster subdivision or zoning and
historic district zoning. In addition, the state code authorizes several tools to manage the form
and location of growth in localities. These include the 2232 review, urban growth boundaries,
special exception permits, density incentives, Traditional Neighborhood Design and New
Urbanist developments, and transfer of development rights programs. The 2232 review is
required when a project is proposed to construct, establish or authorize a public facility not
shown in the comprehensive plan (American Planning Association 2010). The planning
commission determines whether the proposed project is a feature shown in the comprehensive
plan. Establishing the precedent and purposes for planning in Virginia and understanding how
TDR programs work, will set the stage for ascertaining why more localities have not adopted
TDR as a land-use tool to help manage and direct growth, ease development pressures, and
preserve open space.
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Background on TDR in Virginia
The code of Virginia authorizes several tools localities can use to manage the form and
location of growth and development. These are of particular importance given current growth
pressures in many areas of the state. As a Dillon Rule state, localities in Virginia can undertake
only those duties that are expressly granted or necessarily implied. In March of 2005, the
Virginia General Assembly enacted a law enabling Zoning Ordinance provisions to allow
transfer of development rights under the county manager plan of government. Since 2006, the
Code of Virginia has authorized all localities to establish TDR programs (Section 15.2-2316.12316.2). Section 15.2-2316.1 defines several terms pertaining to the legislation and section 15.22316.2 authorizes localities to establish transfer of development rights programs under certain
basic mandatory parameters and optional provisions. The decision to adopt and use this tool is
voluntary since its use is not mandated in the code. Since the adoption of the original statute in
2006 it has been amended several times. In 2007, the legislation was amended to allow the
transfer of development rights across city-county boundaries with the permission of local
governing bodies and approval from the circuit court. Furthermore, the original legislation only
allowed for development rights to be severed from one parcel or land and immediately reattached
to another parcel of land. In order to make TDR more attractive to localities and developers, the
legislation was amended again in 2009. This amendment allowed for the severance of
development rights without immediate reattachment to another property as well as local taxation
of the severed rights until they are reattached to a parcel of land. Once again, in 2010, the
legislation was amended to allow for the development rights permitted to be attached to the
receiving areas to be equal to, or greater than, the development rights severed from the sending
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area. Currently, Frederick and Arlington Counties are the only two municipalities with legal
TDR programs in the state but several other counties are in the process of developing programs.
Under section 15.2-2316.2 of the Code of Virginia, the TDR legislation specifies that no
locality may adopt or amend a transfer of development rights ordinance without giving notice
and holding a public hearing. Furthermore, localities may not require property owners to transfer
development rights as a condition placed on new developments. According to the legislation,
prior to any transfer of development rights, a locality must adopt an ordinance based on findings
of public benefit, including, but not limited to the conservation or promotion of public health,
safety and general welfare. Furthermore, when developing a TDR program, a locality must
accomplish several tasks according to the legislation.
All local ordinances must provide for the severance of development rights from the
sending property as well as the sale, purchase or exchange of these rights prior to the rights being
affixed to a specified receiving property. In addition, sending area development restrictions must
be binding to the current property owner as well as future owners in perpetuity. The instruments
used to issue and record such TDR exchanges must necessarily identify the development rights
being severed as well as the applicable sending and receiving properties. A system for
monitoring the severance, ownership, assignment and transfer of development rights must also
be established.
Furthermore, a map or other description of designated sending and receiving areas must
be provided as well as the identification of any inappropriate receiving areas. The legislation
stipulates that localities must periodically amend the comprehensive plan to show designated
TDR sending and receiving areas. The minimum acreage of the sending property and the
minimum reduction in density on the sending property must also be identified. The development
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rights permitted to be attached in the receiving areas should be equal to or greater than the
development rights severed from the sending areas. The permitted uses and maximum density in
the receiving area should be identified. As well, the infrastructure in the receiving area must be
assessed to ensure its ability to accept any density increases, and any plans to provide necessary
utility services to designated receiving areas must be provided. Any application submitted to the
planning commission must be reviewed for its compliance with the local TDR ordinance and
approved transfers will become effective after they have been recorded and a certified copy of
the recording has been filed with the local governing body.
There are several optional features that can be written in to TDR ordinances. Transfer of
development rights receiving areas can include urban development areas (UDA). Transfer of
development rights programs can work in collaboration with urban development areas because
these areas have been sited for increased density and growth, including the provision of
infrastructure and public facilities. Other optional features include: allowing residential density
to be converted to bonus density on the receiving property (increase in residential density means
an increase in the square footage of commercial use); severance of development rights from
zoned or subdivided properties; the purchase of all or part of the density rights of a sending
property; sending properties to generate one or more forms of renewable energy; tax abatement
for up to 25 years for the owner of the development rights (Code of Virginia; McRoberts 2010).
A final important point for this study is that the legislation stipulates that “[a] county adopting an
ordinance pursuant to this article may designate eligible receiving areas in any incorporated town
within such county, if the governing body of the town has also amended its zoning ordinance to
designate the same areas as eligible to receive density being transferred from sending areas in the
county” (Code of Virginia Chapter 573). According to the literature, while possible and
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important, the process of interjurisdictional transfers can be an extremely time consuming and
cumbersome process.

Current TDR Programs in Virginia
The United States has nearly 100 functioning TDR programs in existence. Although
legislation was initially passed in 2006 enabling localities in Virginia to establish transfer of
development rights programs, only two localities have done so. Frederick County and Arlington
County are the only localities in Virginia with legally operating TDR programs.
In April 2010, Frederick County adopted a TDR ordinance. Lawrence (2010) states that
the purpose of this was to provide an incentive to preserve land and to direct growth to the UDA.
The county had to designate both sending and receiving areas. The sending area was land outside
the UDA that was zoned as a rural area. This land lacked sewer service and had to be more than
twenty acres in size, as well as have road frontage. One development right was kept for every
one hundred acres of land and the land was to exclude easements and un-developable land.
Finally, owners of sending area land must be in good standing with the county regarding tax
payments. Frederick County’s TDR program has a three-tiered system concerning density
bonuses. Receiving areas were to be designated within the existing UDA and provide for public
water and sewer systems.
Under the TDR scheme in Frederick County, each transfer must include a Letter of Intent
as well as a TDR certificate. Rights may be banked but are subject to taxation by the county.
There are as well restrictive deed covenants. Although the enabling legislation does not provide
for a bank for development rights, Frederick County has established their own system of
banking. Establishing a TDR program created several new tasks for the county including
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performing background research to verify where the development rights were coming from and
determining the potential overall density to be accommodated in the designated receiving areas.
The 2005 General Assembly’s passage of TDR legislation allowed Arlington County to
enact a TDR program though its zoning ordinance. In 2006, the Arlington County Board adopted
an amendment to the county’s zoning ordinance, which is the regulating document for the
transfer of development rights. In 2008 the County Board approved a TDR policy document
outlining the eligible purposes of a sending site, eligible locations of sending and receiving site
and the evaluation and calculation of TDRs. Revisions to the policy guidelines were made in
2009. Arlington County’s authority to establish a TDR ordinance, however, falls under the initial
2005 legislation.
The County Board must approve all sending and receiving sites. The County Board will
approve the amount of density or other development rights to be transferred and certify sending
areas. “TDRs from a Certified Sending site can be used only in conjunction with a special
exception site plan application on a proposed Receiving site” (Arlington County - A 2008: 5).
Sending locations may be anywhere in the county, however the property owner must be
committed to restricting the use or density of his property for various purposes outlined in the
ordinance, including: open space, historic preservation, affordable housing, community
recreation or community facilities. The amount of density transferred would generally be based
on the unused by-right density on the sending site and additional density associated with the
TDR program is subject to limitations on the approved receiving site as provided for in the
zoning district regulations (Arlington County A 2008). Sending sites may be rezoned to a higher
density zoning district if this change is consistent with the County’s General Land Use Plan. This
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could increase the amount of density eligible to be transferred. Both sending area owners and
receiving area developers are required to record deed restrictions on the sites.
Eligible receiving sites are limited to those located in two designated corridors (RosslynBallston Corridor and the Jefferson Davis Corridor), but exclude any areas designated in the
General Land Use Plan as “low” residential or parcels or portions of parcels that are within 165
feet of R-zoned districts that are planned for “low” residential (Arlington County – A 2008).
“…Receiving sites are limited to those parcels zoned or proposed for a re-zoning to a district that
allows for a site plan option” (Arlington County – A 2008: 7). Thus, the transfer of development
rights can only occur through a special exception site plan process on the receiving site.
Arlington County’s TDR program is meant to “…preserve important characteristics or
amenities of the community” (Arlington County – B 2008: 2). The County Board will consider
the appropriateness of the increased density or other development rights as well as the
consistency of the site plan with standards in existing county plans and goals. Furthermore, the
Board will consider if the TDR approval is consistent with the zoning ordinance, and if public
health, safety and general welfare of the community will be adversely affected. Additional
density associated with TDRs can exceed the maximum allowable density unless the zoning
district has a maximum cap on height or density. Density may also exceed that of the General
Land Use Plan as long as the proposed site plan complies with the character of existing plans and
relates functionally to existing structures.

Current TDR Legislation: Obstacles and Limitations
In 2007, the Virginia Municipal League (VML) gave a presentation in which concerns
with the then current legislation were outlined. Since the presentation, the legislation has been
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amended but many of the concerns remain applicable. Richardson (2007) and McRoberts (2010)
have confirmed these same concerns and have raised others.
The original legislation (2007) did not provide for the ability to purchase and bank rights
for use at a later date or for a larger development project. This raises the issue of who can act as
the bank as well as what taxes are applied to rights held over time. The inability of localities to
create TDR banks demands that local TDR ordinances be carried out properly the first time
around (Richardson 2007). Furthermore, since localities must negotiate and commit to transfers
prior to receiving approval from the local government, there can be a significant time delay and
uncertainty. This time delay may cause difficulty in determining accurate prices for transferable
rights. The most recent version of the legislation however, does not clearly outline this ability,
but does not require rights to be immediately reattached to a parcel of land.
Local governments may be unwilling to adopt TDR statutes and may need
encouragement. This unwillingness may result from the fact that localities cannot collect cash
proffers on land zoned as receiving areas. When local governments realize that the development
that occurs using development rights under TDR ordinances is by-right according to local zoning
codes, and cash proffers cannot be obtained since no rezoning is involved, they will not adopt
such ordinances (Richardson 2007; McRoberts 2010). Furthermore, incentives may be needed to
avoid political liabilities. The potential of increased by-right density in receiving areas may result
in NIMBY problems for local elected officials (Virginia Municipal League 2007; McRoberts
2010). Thus, TDR may be politically unfeasible without incentives for receiving area residents to
participate.
Richardson (2007) states that the complexity of the enabling legislation makes
implementation difficult and McRoberts (2010) contends that the outcomes of TDR programs in
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Virginia are uncertain. The legislation requires localities to undertake comprehensive planning
prior to implementing a TDR program, a requirement Richardson (2007) terms “enormous.”
“After struggling to provide adequate politically acceptable areas to serve as receiving
zones…communities may well decide to simply pursue good land use planning” (Richardson
2007: 2). However, localities are already required by the Code of Virginia to undertake
comprehensive planning thus this requirement should not be considered an insurmountable
obstacle. Furthermore, since many localities have adopted UDAs, they have likely already
undertaken the task of determining areas appropriate for accommodating density increases.
Insufficient demand for additional density in receiving areas may also be an obstacle (McRoberts
2010). Furthermore, Richardson (2007) and McRoberts (2010) both assert that there is a need to
balance supply and demand of development rights in order to create a market and encourage
participation in TDR programs.

Proposed Solutions
Several proposals have been set forth to mitigate perceived problems with the current
TDR enabling legislation in Virginia. The Virginia Municipal League proposes that broad impact
fees may be a possible solution to localities not being able to accept cash proffers. Allowing
higher by-right density development in new or amended zoning districts under TDR programs
could also mitigate issues pertaining to proffers (McRoberts 2010). Under by-right density, no
proffers are involved. It is assumed that the zoning district is appropriate for the specified area of
the locality. If the receiving area has planned for higher density development, little need exists to
build or install new public infrastructure or community facilities, thus there is no need to extract
cash or non-cash proffers from developers. However, if higher density is allowed by-right, no
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need or incentive exists for developers to purchase development rights. Thus, a certain density
could be allowed by-right, with a potential increase to a higher density if the developer purchases
development rights. Proper planning and education along with downzoning or upzoning can
combat NIMBY problems such as increases in density (McRoberts 2010). Furthermore, a TDR
bank could help to balance supply and demand issues and help create a market for development
rights.
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CHAPTER IV – RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The empirical research conducted through this study was used to understand why few
localities in Virginia have established and implemented transfer of development rights programs
as well as to explore the relationship between planning and politics to better understand how this
interaction affects the formation of policy. While many studies have been conducted on factors
found in successful TDR programs, as well as obstacles and limitations to successful programs,
no such study has been conducted in Virginia specifically. Furthermore, there is a significant
amount of public policy literature pertaining to policy instrument selection, community
characteristics and local politics, but this research will contribute to knowledge pertaining
specifically to the selection of growth management and land preservation tools in localities in
Virginia.

Study Area and Sample Selection
As of 2007, the state of Virginia ranked 44th among states in number of governments
including counties, cities, municipalities and special district governments (U.S. Census Bureau
2011). However, for the purposes of this research, only localities constituting counties and
independent cities were studied because they are the only localities authorized to establish TDR
programs within the Commonwealth of Virginia. Virginia contains a total of 95 counties and 39
independent cities (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). While there is conflicting data regarding the
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number of cities in the state of Virginia, this study obtained information from the Virginia
Municipal League that confirmed there are a total of 39 cities currently in the state. Furthermore,
in a Geography Release Note for 2009, the U.S. Census Bureau confirmed that the independent
city of Clifton Forge had changed its status to become a town and incorporate into Allegheny
County as of July 1, 2001 and was no longer considered as a county equivalent in data reporting
(U.S. Census Bureau 2009). Due to the unique municipal structure of Virginia, and its status as a
Dillon Rule state, this study has the ability to survey every independent locality authorized to
establish a TDR program in order to obtain sufficient data and draw conclusions to advance this
research. A sample was not selected because of this unique situation.

Methodology
To better understand why TDR has not been more widely adopted and accepted as a tool
for managing growth and preserving land in Virginia, I relied on qualitative methods, consisting
of an email survey (Appendix I) built in an online system (Zoomerang). Virginia is particular in
that cities are independent from counties. They operate under separate government structures
with separate municipal budgets. In general, we can assume that cities have no farmland or rural
areas and are entirely built out and counties are less densely populated with abundant open space,
but this is not always the case in Virginia. Several counties in Virginia are very densely
populated and are almost entirely urban. Thus, this research was conducted on every locality in
the state to obtain the most thorough data possible.
The survey was sent to the Planning Director, or person in an equivalent position, in
every selected locality (independent city and county, as identified in the study area) in the state.
This survey sought to gather information to determine if certain factors are constraining the
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development and implementation of TDR programs in Virginia. Several counties in Virginia do
not have zoning ordinances (Buchanan, Carroll, Dickenson, Floyd, Patrick, Russell, Tazewell
and Wythe) and thus do not have a Planning Director or Zoning Administrator. Although they
are unable to implement a TDR program, the survey was sent to these localities in an effort to
collect the most complete data possible. The results from these surveys was be tabulated with all
other responses.
A survey was chosen as the primary means of data collection for several reasons. It was
the fastest and most efficient way for the researcher to contact every locality in the state. Other
methods of data collection may be more reliable, but are significantly more time consuming.
Furthermore, because of the relatively small number of localities to survey, an email survey
allowed the researcher to survey every locality and not limit data collection to a smaller sample.
Secondly, a survey allows individuals to provide answers that they may not otherwise feel
comfortable giving in person or on the phone. The anonymity provided through an email survey
may allow for more accurate data collection. Third, a mix of multiple-choice and open-ended
questions will enable the researcher to cross-reference. Finally, since respondents may respond to
the survey at their convenience, it is likely that more complete information will be gathered.
Contact information was obtained from the Virginia Association of Counties and the
Virginia Municipal League, as it was available and as they were willing to provide. Any
supplementary information was obtained by searching websites of the given locality. No
personal information was collected from respondents and all contact information will be kept
confidential in password-protected files. All responses are presented in aggregate format only
and not associated to any identifiable information. Survey respondents were asked to give
consent to taking the survey prior to answering any questions. Furthermore, they were informed
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that they do not have to answer all questions and that they can stop taking the survey at any time.
Any respondent who declined to give consent to taking the survey was automatically redirected
to a time-out page and no survey responses were obtained from these individuals.
A test survey was distributed to several practicing planning professionals either in local
government planning departments or private planning practices. These professional provided
comments and feedback on the survey so that questions could be clarified or asked in a different
manner. This feedback led to several questions being changed and more detailed questions being
added to the survey.
Prior to the distribution of the survey, a general introductory email was sent identifying
who I am and explaining the research and its purpose. Two follow-up emails were then sent to
any locality that had not responded after the initial distribution of the survey.
These reminder emails resulted in a significant increase in the response rate. A total of 67
complete responses were obtained. Four respondents declined to take the survey and 63
accepted. Three other partial responses were obtained, but the results were not counted in the
data analysis. Ultimately, a 47% response rate was obtained through the email survey to be used
in the data analysis. Survey questions were developed based on relevant literature and previous
research on the factors present in successful TDR programs and obstacles or limitations to
successful program development and implementation (Pizor 1986; Machemer and Kaplowitz
2002; Fulton et al. 2004; Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz 2008; Pruetz and Standridge 2009;
Hanly-Forde et al.; Rose 1975; Pizor 1978; Lane 1998; Woodbury 1975; Pfeffer and Lapping
1994).. These factors were chosen because the aforementioned studies revealed their importance
to TDR program development, implementation and success. While not an exhaustive list of
factors perhaps, it does reflect common themes and conclusions from the studies. All factors
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present in successful TDR programs were mentioned in two or more previous studies. Any
obstacle present in just one study was regarded as important for its relationship to the other
factors or its compelling nature based on current growth and development pressures facing many
localities in Virginia.
As described in more detail in Chapter II, factors present in successful programs include:
•

TDR banks

•

Strong political foundations

•

Community support

•

Background studies and knowledge of local conditions

•

Simplicity

•

Balancing supply and demand to encourage participation

•

Appropriate sending area designation and regulation

•

Sustainable and appropriate receiving areas

Obstacles to successful program development and implementation include:
•

Lack of regional planning

•

Simplicity (too simple or too complex)

•

Lack of community acceptance

•

Difficulty developing a market for development rights

•

Potential legal challenges

•

Lack of proper implementation mechanisms

•

Permanence of easement

These factors were explored through the survey using both open ended and multiple-choice
questions. Since these factors have been cited as significant in previous research, this survey
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drew upon these findings to derive questions. Furthermore, this survey served to confirm or
refute previous findings in terms of their applicability to TDR programs in the Commonwealth of
Virginia.
Other survey questions sought to assess goals of the locality’s comprehensive plan
relating to growth management and land preservation; type of growth and development pressures
facing the locality; level of interest in addressing growth and development pressures; tools that
each locality is currently using for farmland preservation and growth management; level of
regional cooperation; and general demographics (see Feiock and Taveras). These questions
helped inform the discussion pertaining to the relationship between politics and policymaking. I
assumed that current land preservation and growth management programs indicated a strong
commitment to these goals and environment amenable to achieving these goals. It would follow
then, that these communities would be open to the establishment of a TDR program. However, if
there were little or no support behind land preservation and growth management programs in a
given community, I assumed that the local government has little interest in establishing a TDR
program. The survey was also used in part to understand the political environment in which
policymaking in Virginia occurs.
As Easton’s (1957) system theory outlines, inputs into the political system are shaped by
the environment in which they are created and outputs of the political system become eventual
inputs in a self-reinforcing cycle. Thus, the environment, understood in this instance as
community characteristics, greatly affects policymaking behavior. The Code of Virginia
authorizes the use of several instruments for localities to manage growth and preserve open
space, but nearly all are voluntary and some, such as transfer of development rights, are hardly
being used. While there is a significant amount of literature outlining factors present in
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successful programs as well as obstacles and limitations to TDR program development and
implementation, this study also obtained information pertaining to the ideological and theoretical
components of growth management and land preservation policy adoption. Thus, while there
may be factors which clearly aid or hinder the development of TDR programs, other factors
external to program development, may also play a key role in determining which growth
management policies are adopted.
Considering public policy research pertaining to growth management controls and
community character (Baldassare and Protash 1982; Steel and Lovrich 2000; Feiock and
Taveras) this research derived independent variables to be used as proxies for the socioeconomic,
political and demographic character of a given locality to predict the use of growth management
tools, specifically TDR. These community characteristics make up the environment in which
policymaking takes place, as articulated in Easton’s Systems Theory. The independent variables
I used were drawn from several sources and include: level of unemployment, affluence/income,
race, education, housing occupancy, land conservation, population change, population density
and the government structure of each county and independent city in Virginia. I expected that
level of unemployment, affluence, race, land preservation, population change and education will
all reflect the preferences of citizens regarding growth management controls. These citizen
characteristics were obtained from the 2009 American Community Survey, the U.S. Census
Bureau, the Virginia Department of Conservation and Recreation. Other public policy research
relies less heavily on community sociodemographic characteristics and more on the effect of
political structure and institutions in growth management policy decisions (Feiock and Taveras;
Feiock 2004; Lubell, Feiock and de la Cruz 2009). Although there is no consensus in the
literature about the influence of political structure on growth management policy decisions at the
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local level, this study tested the political structure variable with the level of interest a locality has
in developing a TDR program. Findings were used to make generalizations about the effects of
political structure on growth management policy decisions in Virginia. Form of government was
based on the specific government structure of each specific locality. This data was obtained
through a survey question.
Dependent variables consist of: whether or not a locality has growth management as a
stated goal in their comprehensive plan, whether or not a locality has open space or green space
preservation as a stated goal in their comprehensive plan, whether or not a locality has farmland
preservation as a stated goal in their comprehensive plan and the presence of a TDR ordinance (if
a locality has a TDR program, is in the process of developing a program or is not considering
developing a program).
Given the lack of established TDR programs in Virginia, it would seem that some
obstacle(s) is/are hindering use of TDR and this research was undertaken to identify and
understand these obstacles. Whether the obstacles are practical or ideological, this research based
its methodology on previous studies to understand these hindrances and provide policy
recommendations to encourage the use of TDR as a growth management and land preservation
tool in the Commonwealth of Virginia. According to pragmatic rationality, truth cannot be
separated from the context in which it was produced; therefore, contextualizing policymaking
decisions was important to this research.

Data Analysis
Survey results were tabulated and compiled by Zoomerang, the program used to
administer the survey, and downloaded as Excel files. Two different data sets were obtained.
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One included coded responses and the other consisted of frequencies represented as percentages
based on the number of respondents answering a specific question. Any results not already coded
by the survey program were coded by hand. Furthermore, certain questions were used to create
new variables to enable easier data analysis. For the data analysis, counties and cities were coded
separately to account for any differences in responses. Results were uploaded into SPSS and new
variable names were added.
Secondary data were collected from the United States Census Bureau and the Virginia
Department of Conservation and Recreation. All data, except median household income, that
were not originally represented as percentages from the U.S. Census, were converted into
percentages to allow for easier, and more thorough analysis. New variables were calculated using
secondary data (population density, population change and per cent protected land). When
determining the percent of protected land in a locality, data for total land area were obtained in
square miles and converted to acres since the data pertaining to protected land obtained from the
Virginia Department of Conservation and Recreation (DCR) was in acres. This enabled me to
easily calculate the amount of protected land (federal, state, local, and private holdings) as a
percent of a locality’s total land area. Data for any city or county that did not respond to the
survey were deleted from the dataset and the remaining data were uploaded into SPSS and
combined with the survey data.
Fill in the blank and open-ended answers were analyzed using content analysis
techniques (Gaber and Gaber 2007). The goal was to analyze recurring words or phrases and
eventually cross-reference the results with the multiple choice questions to distill similarities
among overall responses regarding trends and identifiable obstacles to TDR program
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development in Virginia. Data obtained and aggregated from these responses have been depicted
in tables.
Results were analyzed using different techniques in Excel and SPSS. Most basically,
descriptive statistics and frequencies were used to obtain general statistics for various survey
questions. Cross tabulations were also performed. Independent sample t-tests were performed to
discern significant differences between various socio-economic and demographic characteristics
and stated goals in a locality’s comprehensive plan relating to land preservation and growth
management. Furthermore, independent sample t-tests were performed to measure significant
differences in socio-economic and demographic characteristics among localities with TDR
programs, or in the process of developing a TDR program and localities not considering adopting
a TDR program at this time. Different levels of significance have been used as is visible in
different data sets.
Charts and graphs have also been used to depict some multiple choice and categorical
variable results. Results are either represented as a percent out of one-hundred or as a per cent of
total responses to a given question. In these instances, responses do not add up to a total of one
hundred percent.
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CHAPTER V – RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The research results show that a majority of survey respondents are not considering
adopting a TDR ordinance at this time. Survey respondents perceive many obstacles to TDR
program development and express a genuine lack of understanding of the benefits TDR can offer
their locality. Furthermore, the survey results indicate that a majority of localities in Virginia are
heavily reliant on other tools to manage growth and development. However, the tools currently
being used in Virginia to manage growth and development are not part of a long-term,
comprehensive planning process, but reactive measures made in response to individual
development proposals.
Of the 63 localities that responded to the survey, 73% (46) were counties and 27% (17)
were cities. Every city and all but four counties have a planning department. The presence of a
planning department may indicate skilled and knowledgeable staff and may have the ability to
employ more complex planning tools. Furthermore, a planning department means that the
locality has a dedicated staff to oversee issues relating to growth management and land
preservation, although the staff may oversee more pressing and immediate issues on a daily
basis. No respondent was an elected official; all were either appointed or otherwise hired. Table
4 shows how long the respondents have been in their respective positions.
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Table 4: Tenure of Respondents
0-2 years

2-5 years

5-10 years

10-15 years

15 or more

County

6

8

17

5

10

City

1

4

5

2

5

Of the responses received, one county has a legally functioning TDR program, 10 (all
counties) are in the process of establishing TDR programs or are considering adopting a TDR
program while 52 (35 counties and 17 cities) are not considering adopting a TDR program at this
time. Even though one locality has a legally functioning TDR program, the sample is too small to
draw any generalizations regarding what type of localities in Virginia adopt TDR programs and
why they choose to use this tool. Furthermore, no transactions have occurred to date and the
level of success of this program cannot be determined. Thus, the responses of this locality are
included with the results obtained from localities thinking of developing a TDR program or that
are currently in the process of developing a TDR program. Data was therefore analyzed using
two groups: localities with TDR programs, considering adopting a TDR program or in the
process of developing a TDR program and localities not considering adopting a TDR program at
this time.
In order to understand the environment in which decisions regarding development and
implementation of TDR programs is taking place, the survey included questions regarding level
of urbanization, development pressures, and goals regarding land preservation and growth
management. Answers to these questions, along with data obtained from the U.S. Census, help to
contextualize decision-making behavior among the localities. While these answers are
subjective, they do not invalidate the results. Truth, according to pragmatic rationality, cannot be
dissociated from the context in which it was produced. Therefore all information obtained from
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the survey helps to contextualize decision-making behavior but is only as accurate as the context
in which it was produced.

Urbanization and Development Pressures
It is likely that counties and cities view their level of urbanization and development
pressures differently. Most people would assume that counties are more rural and cities are more
urban. However, with current growth trends, many sub-urban and rural areas face greater growth
and development pressures than cities, blurring the lines between urban and rural. This is
illustrated by the fact that Virginia’s population density is decreasing, indicating that far from
being more compact, new developments are more spread out (Virginia Performs).
Among counties that responded to the survey, 27 (59%) respondents characterized their
county as rural, 17 (37%) as urban-rural fringe, two (4%) as urbanizing and none were
characterized as highly urban. While it is not surprising that a majority of counties are rural, a
significant number also indicated that they are urban-rural fringe areas. Such areas are very
susceptible to growth and development pressures and are ideal candidates for implementing TDR
programs. On that note, four (9%) counties responded that they are facing a high level of
development pressure, 16 (35%) responded that they are experiencing a moderate level of
development pressure, 19 (41%) responded that they are experiencing a low level of
development pressure, three (6%) responded they were experiencing no development pressure
and four (9%) responded that they were facing some other level of development pressure.
Not surprisingly, 10 of the 17 (59%) cities characterized themselves as highly urbanized,
three (18%) as urbanizing and four (23%) as urban-rural fringe. Every city also indicated that
they were not facing high levels of development pressure. In fact, a majority 11 (65%) indicated
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that they were experiencing low levels of development pressures, 4 (23%) were experiencing
moderate levels of development pressure and two (12%) said they were not facing development
pressures. These observations suggest that cities in Virginia face significantly lower development
pressures than counties, and that development in Virginia is more land extensive, rather than
dense and compact.
Figure 2: Level of Urbanization

Figure 3: Development Pressure
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Development pressures in rural areas most likely are generating sprawl based on
traditional by-right zoning regulations. These results are consistent with statistics that indicate
Virginia is experiencing a high rate of suburban growth and low-density development (Virginia
Performs). This means that land is being used inefficiently for development and not preserved.
While development must be accommodated, some patterns of land use can effectively
accommodate growth and development pressures while preserving open space. Clearly there is a
need for greater reliance on growth management and land preservation tools across Virginia,
particularly in counties.

Land Preservation and Growth Management Goals
Based on the character of localities that responded to the survey, and the development
pressure they face, a majority of localities likely employ land preservation or growth
management tools to preserve agricultural land and rural character. If, however, a locality does
not perceive a current threat of population growth or development pressures, it may not be
inclined to employ tools to manage these issues. Similarly, certain localities may want to
encourage development to induce economic growth and thus place low priority on preserving
land. However, the time to employ land preservation and growth management tools is not when
faced with an urgent need, but in a proactive attempt to direct the future of a locality. This will
also aid in efficient land development.
When asked about open space and green space preservation a total of 58 (92%)
respondents said their locality has open space or green space preservation goals in their
comprehensive plans, while only four (6%) did not. Of the respondents with open space and
green space preservation as stated goals in their comprehensive plans, 42 (72%) were counties
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and 16 (28%) were cities. Similarly, a total of 44 (76%) respondents said that farmland
preservation was a stated goal in their comprehensive plan. The overwhelming majority of these
represented counties (41 or 71%), not surprisingly. Regarding growth management goals, a total
of 46 (79%) localities stated that these were explicitly outlined in their comprehensive plans.
These localities included 40 of 46 (87%) counties, but only 6 out of 16 (38%) cities.
This is not surprising given that most cities indicated they were highly urbanized and
were facing low levels of development pressures. If a locality feels that it is fully developed, it
may not see a need to manage growth. In contrast, a large proportion of Virginia counties are
seeking to preserve land and manage growth.

Socio-economic Characteristics and Comprehensive Plan Goals
The literature assumes that land preservation and growth management are two sides of
the same coin. When land is preserved, it prevents development and when growth is managed
properly, it preserves land. Land preservation mechanisms can be used to preserve intrinsic
value, ecological habitats, or environmentally sensitive areas, but also to prohibit growth and
development. Consequently, this research assumes that the socio-economic characteristics that
lead to the use of growth management tools can also lead to the use of land preservation
mechanisms.
The tables below compare particular socio-economic characteristics of localities with
stated open/green space preservation, farmland preservation or growth management goals in their
comprehensive plans with localities that do not have these stated goals. Statistics for the two
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groups relate to characteristics of: race, unemployment, poverty, urban and rural2, median
household income, educational attainment, protected land, total occupied housing units,
population density and rate of population growth. These characteristics help illustrate the
socioeconomic environment in which decisions regarding growth management and land
preservation occur in Virginia.

2

Urban is classified as all territory, population, and housing units located within urbanized areas
(UAs) and urban clusters (UCs). These areas represent densely developed territory, consisting of
residential, commercial, and other nonresidential urban land uses. In general, these areas feature
high population densities and urban land uses resulting in a representation of the “urban
footprint.” Rural consists of all territory, population, and housing units located outside UAs and
UCs. (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).
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Open Space and Green Space Preservation Goals
Table 5: Comparison of average social characteristics in localities with and without open
space or green space preservation goals in their comprehensive plan (Q15)
Yes
(n=58)

SD

No
(n=4)

SD

Significance

% White

73.7

14.478

67.4

32.475

.725

% Black

18.2

13.809

29.5

30.876

.520

% Hispanic or Latino

4.3

4.288

1.2

1.229

.005*

% Unemployed

6.2

2.546

6.1

3.964

.953

% In poverty

12.4

6.623

12.9

3.701

.825

% Urban

48.2

39.638

35.7

44.559

.620

% Rural

51.8

39.638

64.3

44.559

.620

Median Household Income

29,972 8,721.456 25,954 3,787.928 .123

% Bachelor’s degree (25 years +)

25.1

13.069

15.3

6.652

.049*

% HS graduate (25 years +)

82.5

6.300

77.0

6.000

.166

% Land protected

12.4

13.747

23.0

26.038

.477

% Total occupied housing

88.6

6.049

80.8

14.796

.365

% Vacant housing

11.4

6.049

19.3

14.796

.365

Population Density

1.2

2.155

1.1

2.198

.937

Population change 1990-2010 (%)

35.7

45.3

10.4

24.4

.561

Renter occupied units

29.3

11.460

27.0

10.739

.707

*=significant at the .05 level
+=significant at the .1 level
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare mean values of socio-economic
characteristics in localities with and without stated open space or green space preservation goals
in comprehensive plans among localities around Virginia (Table 5). Significant differences were
found at the .05 significance level in the scores for Hispanic/Latino population and percent of the
population with a Bachelor’s degree. No other differences between the two groups were
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significant even at the 0.1 significance level. Therefore, education and race may be factors in the
adoption of open space and green space preservation goals; however, these differences are more
likely due to sampling errors and the low number of localities that do not have open space or
green space preservation goals. In general, it appears that localities with and without open space
and green space preservation goals are more similar than they are different.
No real conclusions can be drawn from these findings. All localities have a nearly equal
chance of adopting open space and green space preservation goals. Although the Code of
Virginia enables localities to designate open space preservation goals in their comprehensive
plans, it is not a mandated requirement. These results may indicate that open space has intrinsic
value to the community and is therefore provided as a public good by the government.
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Farmland Preservation Goals
Table 6: Comparison of average social characteristics in localities with and without
farmland preservation goals in their comprehensive plans (Q16)
Yes

SD

(n=44)

No

SD

Significance

(n=17)

% White

76.8

13.836

63.5

16.964

.008*

% Black

17.4

13.561

23.7

18.725

.281

% Hispanic or Latino

3.0

2.611

7.1

7.620

.044*

% Unemployed

5.7

1.985

7.5

3.543

.057+

% In poverty

11.5

4.509

15.4

9.186

.110

% Urban

28.2

30.090

95.3

7.547

.000*

% Rural

71.8

30.090

4.7

7.547

.000*

Median Household Income

29,541

6,348.372

29,885

12,950.246

.981

% Bachelor’s degree (25 years +)

22.2

10.882

29.6

16.576

.104

% HS graduate (25 years +)

81.2

5.808

84

7.374

.170

% Land protected

16.5

15.805

4.1

6.103

.000*

% Total occupied housing

86.9

7.694

91.1

3.344

.004*

% Vacant housing

13.1

7.694

8.9

3.344

.004*

Population Density (per acre)

.39

.849

3.5

2.866

.000*

Population change 1990-2010 (%)

34.7

30.9

33.2

70.7

.011*

% Renter occupied units

24.7

7.578

40.9

11.486

.000*

*=significant at the .05 level
+=significant at the .1 level
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare socio-economic characteristics
of localities with and without stated farmland preservation goals in their comprehensive plans
(Table 6). As indicated, there is a significant difference in per cent white population, per cent
Hispanic or Latino population, level of urbanity, per cent of land protected, per cent of total
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occupied housing units, rate of population change 1990-2010, population density and pre cent of
renter occupied housing units at the .05 significance level. At the 0.1 significance level, a
significant difference in unemployment also was observed. These results suggest that race,
housing occupancy, population density, amount of protected land, population growth rates,
unemployment and level of urbanity all have an effect on whether or not a locality has stated
farmland preservation goals in their comprehensive plan. Specifically, localities with stated
farmland preservation goals have larger white populations, lower Hispanic or Latino populations,
lower rates of unemployment, are significantly more rural, have a larger per cent of their land
area protected, have lower overall housing occupancy, including fewer renters, have higher
growth rates, and have significantly lower population densities.
These results indicate that more rural, less dense, economically sound, racially
homogenous communities with more protected land are more likely to adopt farmland
preservation goals. Localities without stated farmland preservation goals have larger Hispanic or
Latino populations, are significantly more urban, have less land protected, have higher housing
occupancy rates, including more renters, and have much higher population densities.
It is not surprising that localities with stated farmland preservation goals in their
comprehensive plans would be significantly more rural than localities without stated farmland
preservation goals. In Virginia, a higher level of rurality also correlates with higher per cent
white population. Many urban areas have no farmland to protect and in general, counties tend to
be more rural in nature. This supports the survey finding that a majority of localities with
farmland preservation goals are counties. The comparison of average socio-economic
characteristics also shows that localities with farmland preservation as a stated goal in their
comprehensive plan have a significantly higher percent of land in their locality protected. This
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may be due to specific zoning regulations, the employment of agricultural districting, the use of
Right-to-Farm laws, or simply because these areas are more dedicated to land preservation. The
literature notes that localities committed to land preservation are ideal candidates for adopting
TDR programs (Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002; Kaplowitz, Machemer and Pruetz 2008). These
localities also tend to have a higher housing vacancy rate and a higher per cent white population.
As the literature indicates, sub-urban and rural areas tend to be predominantly white and the
findings confirm this information. The housing vacancy rate might be explained by the lower
population density, the overbuilding of homes during the housing boom, or out-migration to
cities. It could also be explained by the desire of families to build new homes as opposed to
living in existing structures. Finally, the difference in vacancy patterns might be explained by a
sampling error based on a relatively small sample size. In terms of the difference in renter
occupied units, this is easily explained by the fact that a majority of localities with farmland
preservation goals in their comprehensive plans are counties. In general, cities have higher rates
of renter occupied units than counties.
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Growth Management Goals
Table 7: Comparison of average social characteristics in localities with and without growth
management goals in their comprehensive plans (Q 9)
Yes
(n=46)

SD

No
(n=16)

SD

Significance

% White

74.7

14.671

70.1

19.156

.393

% Black

17.7

13.723

22.8

18.790

.331

% Hispanic or Latino

4.0

5.301

3.9

3.221

.958

% Unemployed

5.7

2.238

7.5

3.211

.051+

% In poverty

10.9

5.307

17.1

6.882

.004*

% Urban

38.8

35.790

65.9

44.047

.037*

% Rural

61.2

35.790

34.1

44.047

.037*

Median Household Income

30,990 7423.991 24,289 5886.045 .001*

% Bachelor’s degree (25 years +)

24.7

11.457

20.4

11.242

.195

% HS graduate (25 years +)

82.5

5.969

80.2

6.442

.219

% Land protected

15.5

15.451

5.9

9.894

.007*

% Total occupied housing

87.8

7.692

87.4

6.743

.850

% Vacant housing

12.2

7.692

12.6

6.743

.850

Population Density (per acre)

.71

1.519

2.14

2.323

.032*

Population change 1990-2010 (%)

42.8

47.6

7.4

18.1

.031*

Renter occupied units

25.8

8.646

37.1

14.037

.007*

*=significant at the .05 level
+=significant at the .1 level
An independent samples t-test was also conducted to compare the socio-economic
characteristics of localities with and without stated growth management goals in their
comprehensive plans (Table 7). There was a significant difference at the 0.05 significance level
in the scores for renter occupied housing units, rate of population change 1990-2010, population
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density, percent of protected land, median household income, level of urbanity, and per cent of
the population in poverty. At the 0.1 significance level, difference in unemployment is also
significant. These results suggest that economics and population growth have an effect on
whether or not a locality adopts growth management goals. Specifically, localities with stated
growth management goals in their comprehensive plans have fewer renter occupied housing
units, a significantly larger rate of population growth between 1990 and 2010, much lower
population densities, a higher percentage of protected land in their locality, higher median
household incomes, are more rural, have lower levels of poverty and lower levels of
unemployment. Therefore, localities with stated growth management goals in their
comprehensive plans are less dense, more rural areas with higher population growth rates.
Furthermore, these localities are in general, better off economically as they reveal higher median
incomes, lower levels of poverty and lower levels of unemployment. These areas also show a
dedication to land preservation as they have a significantly higher percent of the land area of
their locality protected.
These findings are consistent with the literature, which indicates that localities committed
to growth management tend to be more affluent and have lower rates of poverty and
unemployment. Although the literature also suggests that education is a factor, this research did
not reveal such a finding. Furthermore, this research does not support the claim in the literature
that racially homogenous communities are more likely to adopt growth management tools. This
may suggest either a sampling error or that certain socioeconomic factors are not as important in
Virginia as they may be in other areas of the country. An interesting finding is that localities
committed to growth management also seem to have a significantly higher percentage of their
land protected through conservation easements, or through federal, state, local or non-profit
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holdings. This finding suggests that land preservation and growth management are
complementary goals and that localities seeking to manage growth are also concerned with
protecting land. Furthermore, it could indicate that the presence of protected land serves a dual
purpose of managing growth.

Growth Management and Land Preservation Tools
Commonly Used Tools for Farmland Preservation
As has been noted, a majority of localities reported farmland preservation as a stated goal
in their comprehensive plan. Respondents were asked to indicate all of the tools they employ to
preserve farmland in their locality. The results show that many localities employ more than one
method of farmland preservation. The tools most commonly used are: agricultural zoning (48 –
76%), preferential taxation or tax relief programs (37 – 59%), agricultural districts (26 – 41%),
right-to-farm laws (15 – 24%), PDR (14 – 22%), or other (8 – 13%) (Figure 4). In fourteen
(22%) localities, no farmland preservation tools are employed.
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Figure 4: Percent of Respondents Using Farmland Preservation Tools

Respondents were also asked to rate the importance of each of the tools used for farmland
preservation in their locality (low, moderate, high, not sure or N/A). The greatest importance was
placed on agricultural zoning, preferential taxation/tax relief programs and agricultural districts
(Figure 5). These were also the top three most commonly used farmland preservation tools
among localities in Virginia. A majority of respondents were either unsure of how important
various farmland preservation tools were in their locality or did not employ farmland
preservation tools.
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Figure 5: Importance of Farmland Preservation Tools

Commonly Used Tools for Growth Management
A majority of respondents, particularly those representing counties, also indicated that
growth management was a stated goal in their comprehensive plans. The Code of Virginia
authorizes many tools that can be used to manage/deal with growth pressures in localities around
the state and this research sought to find out how they were doing so. Survey respondents were
asked to indicate which tools were employed by their locality to manage growth. Results are as
follows: special exception permits/conditional use permits (52 – 83%), New
Urbanism/Traditional Neighborhood Design (25 – 40%), 2232 review (22 – 35%), density
incentives (21 – 33%), urban growth boundaries (16 – 25%), transfer of development rights (1 –
2%), other (16 – 25%) (Figure 6). Another seven (11%) respondents answered that no tools were
employed to manage growth in their locality.
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Interestingly, though not surprisingly, an overwhelming majority of localities employ
special exception or conditional use permits to manage growth. According to the American
Planning Association (2010), nearly every locality authorizes the use of special exception
permits and many employ them on a frequent basis. Special exception uses are considered to
have a greater impact on neighboring properties or the public than uses permitted by-right in the
zoning district. Uses classified as special exceptions may have separate and specialized
conditions imposed on them by the locality to mitigate any potentially adverse impacts. Thus, the
impacts of growth can be mitigated through conditions placed on the individual developments by
the governing body.
Managing growth through the use of special exception/conditional use permits is
problematic because, far from being a proactive measure taken to manage growth and
development, they are reactive measures made in response to a development proposal. This
method of growth management not only seems to be difficult but also extremely inefficient, both
in terms of time and financial resources.
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Figure 6: Percent of Respondents Using Growth Management Tools

Importance of Growth Management Tools
Of the tools used to manage growth in Virginia, special exception/conditional use permits
were the most important, as they ranked most favorably in both the moderate importance and
high importance categories (Figure 7). Also of high importance to localities were urban growth
boundaries, New Urbanism/Traditional Neighborhood Design (TND) and other growth
management tools. However, more respondents felt that New Urbanism/Traditional
Neighborhood Design (TND) and urban growth boundaries were of low importance in managing
growth. Other tools commonly ranked in the low importance category were density incentives,
2232 review and transfer of development rights. A majority of respondents seemed unsure of the
importance of various tools to manage growth in their locality. Every tool, except special
exception/conditional use permits ranked highest in the not sure/N/A category. These results
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demonstrate the overwhelming importance of special exception permits as the growth
management tool of choice among Virginia localities.
Figure 7: Importance of Growth Management Tools

A reliance on special exception permits to manage growth is problematic since permits
are approved as development proposals are presented. Special exception permits are not part of a
comprehensive plan and do not help outline the nature of growth and development patterns in a
locality. Thus, this method for managing growth will likely prove to be ineffective in the long
term.

Managing the Fiscal Impacts of Growth
While managing growth and preserving farmland and open space are demonstrable goals,
understanding how localities manage the fiscal impacts of these goals is also important. A
majority (61%) of respondents said they use conditional zoning or cash proffers to manage the
financial impacts of growth, far more than any other tool (Figure 8). Conditional zoning can be
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used only if a rezoning is required for development and not if the land is already zoned for
development, unless an application for greater intensity has been submitted by the landowner
(American Planning Association 2010). Thus, cash proffers cannot be assessed for by-right
development.
Both special exception/conditional use permits, as well as conditional zoning/cash
proffers, are reactive measures to growth. Reactive measures can take planning only so far.
Without a proactive approach, growth and development will continue to be haphazard and
consume valuable resources.
Figure 8: Percent of Respondents Using Tools to Manage the Fiscal Impacts of Growth

Importance of Tools to Manage Fiscal Impacts of Growth
Managing the fiscal impacts of growth is of extreme importance. While many tools to
manage growth cost both the developer and the localitiy money, others can be exectued at little
to no cost to the community. The results of the survey indicate that localities place the highest
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importance on conditional zoning/cash proffers to manage the fiscal impacts of growth. This is
no surprise given that a majority of localities use this tool to manage the fiscal impacts of
growth. However, in general, respondents seem unsure of the importance placed on various tools
used to manage the fiscal impacts of growth (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Importance of Tools to Manage Fiscal Impacts of Growth

The Virginia Municipal League (2007) has suggested that broad impact fees may be a
suitable substitute for the extraction of proffers. Curently, however, impact fees are hardly being
used and are of little importance. It could be used more frequently, but does not, in any event,
hold the locality responsible for proper planning.

Support for Open Space Preservation, Farmland Preservation and Growth Management Tools
To better understand the environment in which decisions regarding growth management
are made, I asked respondents to rate the level of support for open space preservation, farmland
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preservation or growth management goals by certain stakeholder groups. These included: county
department heads, county commission/legislature, county manager, city government officials,
neighborhood organizations, environmental groups, real estate developers, homeowners
associations, local businesses, the media and the general public. Possible responses were:
strongly oppose, oppose, neutral, support, strongly support, not sure or N/A. Based on the
responses received, it appears that in general, respondents are not clear on how various
stakeholder groups regard their locality’s land preservation and growth management goals. I had
hoped this question would yield more information on the views of various groups regarding these
important comprehensive plan goals. This also would have helped reveal the environment in
which growth management decisions are taking place.
Regarding growth management goals, a majority of respondents noted that most groups
were either neutral or supportive. However, several respondents noted that real estate developers
are opposed to their locality’s growth management goals. Most respondents feel the general
public fall in the “support” category and that county department heads, county
commission/legislature, county manager and environmental groups lie in the “strongly support”
category.
Regarding farmland and open space preservation goals, respondents noted that most
groups are neutral, supportive or strongly supportive. Environmental groups were among the
most supportive groups and the general public was viewed as supportive of farmland/open space
preservation goals. Other groups reported to be supportive of farmland/open space preservation
goals include: county department heads, county commission/legislature, county manager, city
government officials and environmental groups.
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Localities With a TDR Program or In the Process/Considering a TDR Program
Since transfer of development rights programs can be used for many purposes, I sought to
understand why localities in Virginia are interested in TDR. The reasons ascertained for adopting
or considering this tool relate to two main issues. These include: a) farmland, agricultural or rural
preservation (4) or b) because it is a stated goal in their comprehensive plan and could be used
for growth management (5) (Table 8). Two respondents noted that compensation is an important
aspect as it would maintain undeveloped land and support rural landowners in the event that
downzoning occurred. One respondent also commented that his locality was considering
adopting a TDR program to promote active farming in their locality. One locality commented
that when development pressures were strong several years ago, the possibility of designating
viable sending and receiving areas was high; however, with the slower development market and
a lack of model programs in the state, they have stopped work on their draft ordinance for the
time being. Finally, one respondent noted that TDR could be used both to promote rural
preservation and compact, higher-density development in designated growth areas.
Table 8: Reasons for considering adopting a TDR program (Q44)
Reason

Number of Responses3

Farmland, rural or agricultural preservation

4

Goal in comprehensive plan

5

Compensate landowners

2

Promote farming

1

Compact, higher-density development in designated areas

1

Development interests

1

3

Number of responses do not add up to number of respondents because respondents gave
multiple and detailed answers.
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In these counties, the development of a TDR program was initiated most frequently by
the planning commission or board of supervisors (5), followed by the planning director (3) or for
some other reason, including that it is a stated goal in the comprehensive plan or initiation by
some combination of stakeholders including citizens, the EDA, planning commission, non-profit
organization, and the county board (4). In only one instance were citizens an impetus in the
initiation of a TDR ordinance.

Stakeholder Pressure and Initiation of TDR Program
Survey respondents also were asked if there was any pressure from various stakeholders
to develop a TDR program and about their level of interest in such a program. Results are
summarized in Table 9.
All respondents but one indicated that there was pressure from rural landowners to
develop a TDR program. The level of interest of rural landowners in developing a TDR program
was reported to be high (1), moderate (3) and low (7). Pressure to establish a TDR program most
often came from developers and elected officials. In two counties, there was pressure from
developers to establish a program while in seven there was no pressure from developers. Some
said their level of interest was moderate (4) or low (7). Two counties reported pressure to
develop a TDR program from elected officials with a moderate (5) to low (6) level of interest.
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Table 9: Pressure and Level of Interest from Stakeholders in Localities with a TDR
Program or Considering Adopting a TDR Program
Pressure

Level of Interest

Yes

No

None

Low

Moderate

High

Rural Landowners

1

6

0

7

3

1

Developers

2

7

0

7

4

0

Elected Officials

2

4

0

6

5

0

These results indicate that there is little pressure from stakeholders to develop a TDR
program. According to the literature, a TDR program must have the support of the community
and elected officials to be successful. Stakeholder groups in Virginia indicate a low to moderate
level of interest and this may play a key role in the success of a TDR program. If there no
interest at all, a TDR program will not be successful as stakeholders will most likely not
participate. Interest in a TDR program indicates that stakeholders are open to participating in the
program but may need support or encouragement.

Background Study
Among localities with a TDR program, in the process of developing a TDR program, or
considering adopting one, six stated they had conducted background studies on the feasibility of
a TDR program while three responded that they had not done so. The literature notes that
background studies are crucial to the success of TDR programs; counties that conducted
background studies may have a higher chance of success by tailoring their TDR program to the
needs of the community. Localities considering a TDR program may not have conducted a
background study, but are advised to do so to increase the likelihood of program success.
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Biggest Obstacles to Developing and Implementing a TDR Program
Survey participants were asked what were or are the biggest obstacles to developing a
TDR program in their locality. Table 10 shows an aggregate summary of the responses received
and the frequency of each response.
Table 10: Biggest obstacles to developing a TDR program (Q53)
Reasons

Number of Responses4

Incentives (monetary, bonus density)

2

Slow residential development demand

1

Lack of model TDR program in the state

2

Staffing concerns

2

Defining and supporting sending areas

1

Defining, supporting, accommodating growth in receiving area

3

Still researching

1

Ability to collect proffers on new units vs. ease of by-right
development

1

Public acceptance or support

3

Defining, supporting and accommodating growth in receiving areas was the main
concern. This relates to the other most important response, which was public acceptance or
support. One respondent noted that “[w]hile many residents support rural preservation initiatives,
many living within designated growth areas so not support high-density development in their
backyards.” This can cause NIMBY problems and public and political concern. Of particular
interest in this regard, as one respondent noted, was that since the increased density would be
allowed by-right, no public hearing would occur prior to the increased development.

4

Number of responses do not add up to number of respondents because respondents gave
multiple and detailed answers.
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Other stated obstacles to developing a TDR program include: slow residential
development demand, staffing concerns (other priorities, no money to hire a consultant),
incentives (either financial or determining an appropriate transfer ratio), the trade off between the
ease of by-right zoning versus the ability to collect proffers on new developments (that involve
rezonings), defining and sustaining sending areas, and a lack of functioning or model programs
in Virginia. Despite the small number of responses received, these responses do point to a variety
of obstacles facing localities developing TDR program in Virginia. It is clear, however, that
some factors are paramount in hindering the development of TDR programs, even given the
small sample. Since every locality in the state is different in terms of socioeconomic
characteristics, land area, growth and development pressures, and political institutions, every
obstacle should be considered and addressed individually in each locality.
Fewer respondents gave answers on what were or are the biggest obstacles to
implementing a TDR program in their locality, but these included: a need for additional staff to
implement and maintain the program, citizen and political support, lack of development demand
and financial concerns.

Localities Not Considering Establishing a TDR Program
A majority of respondents (83%) said that they were not thinking of developing a TDR
program. These responses will help ascertain reason why localities in Virginia are not
considering adopting a TDR program. Table 11 shows an aggregate list of responses. The top
response was simply that there was no need. Some respondents noted only that there was no need
for a TDR program in their locality. Other respondents elaborated on the lack of need by stating
that their locality was fully developed or fully built out (urban areas). Many respondents felt that
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because of low or no development demand, pressure or activity in their locality, a TDR program
would be useless. One respondent noted, “…at this time, development pressure has significantly
dropped off, and the current governing body is more development than preservation minded,”
even reducing support for current preservation programs. Others felt there was no need for a
TDR program because they were successfully using or considering other tools to manage growth
and preserve land. Some respondents noted that they had experienced success with voluntary
easements, tax credits or a PDR program, thus rendering a TDR program unnecessary.
Several respondents also noted that there was no demand, pressure, interest or support
from stakeholders in their locality. One respondent noted that this was due to the existence of
proffered rezonings. Another noted that there is no group pushing the development of a TDR
program and that because there is little residential development, developers can satisfy demand
with the allowed density under current zoning and are not inclined to pay an additional expense
for an increase in density. Yet another noted this was due to the economy and lack of
development. Other major concerns were staffing issues and other staff priorities, economic
reasons, and the view that TDR is an abstract, cumbersome and complicated process whereby the
benefits are difficult to ascertain and explain. Some respondents noted, “[t]he whole concept of
sending and receiving areas is too abstract and difficult to explain the benefits” and “[w]e do not
truly understand the benefit of TDRs.”
As is evidenced by these responses, there are many interconnected reasons as to why
localities in Virginia are not considering adopting TDR programs at this time.
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Table 11: Reasons for not considering adopting a TDR program (Q56)
Number of Responses5

Reason
No need
No need only

7

No need – fully developed

5

No need – considering/using other tools

5

No need – low/no development pressure/activity/demand

14

No need – low population growth

2

No demand/pressure/interest/support from Board of Supervisors,
politicians, citizens

10

Staffing concerns and other priorities

8

Cumbersome/complicated/abstract/cannot explain benefits

5

Economic reasons (want development)

4

No viable receiving area

3

Current zoning does not allow for determination of development rights 2
Budgetary issues

2

Waiting for a successful program in Virginia

1

Receiving area already zoned for high density development

1

No market or support for development rights

1

Under discussion

1

Not being discussed

1

Background Study
Of localities not considering a TDR program, 26 (50%) said that they had considered the
possibility of a program and 26 (50%) said that they had not. However, only one respondent said
their locality had conducted a background feasibility study. A majority (32 or 62%) of

5

Number of responses do not add up to number of respondents because respondents gave
multiple and detailed answers.
92

respondents said they had not considered and not ruled out a TDR program and only 9 (17%)
said they had ruled it out for similar reasons as why TDR programs are not being considered.
Since many localities have not considered and ruled out the use of a TDR program, there is the
possibility that with sufficient education, resources, and help, some localities may consider using
this tool.

Stakeholder Pressure and Initiation of TDR Program
To understand the environment in which decisions regarding the adoption of TDR
ordinances are taking place, I sought to discern the amount of pressure and level of interest
expressed among various stakeholder groups (Table 12).
Table 12: Pressure and Level of Interest from Stakeholders in Localities not Considering
Adopting a TDR Program
Pressure

Level of Interest

Yes

No

None

Low

Moderate

High

Rural Landowners

0

48

42

10

0

0

Developers

0

47

42

10

0

0

Elected Officials

0

50

42

10

0

0

Note: Totals may differ because questions were not mandatory.
Unlike localities that have adopted TDR ordinances or are considering/in the process of
adopting such ordinances, localities not considering TDR ordinances have seen no stakeholder
pressure to do so. Furthermore, in a majority or instances, stakeholder groups have expressed no
interest and if any interest was expressed, it seems negligible.
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Socio-Economic Characteristics and TDR Program Adoption
While my study sought to understand actual, identifiable obstacles to the development
and implementation of TDR programs in Virginia, the literature indicates that certain socioeconomic characteristics of localities may influence decisions to adopt growth management and
land preservation tools. These characteristics in part make up the environment in which Easton’s
System Theory operates. Thus, they are important when considering why certain tools are not
being used.
Table 13 shows a comparison of select socio-economic characteristics among localities
with TDR programs/in the process of adopting TDR programs/considering adopting TDR
programs (“yes”), and localities that are not considering adopting a TDR program at this time
(“no”).
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Table 13: Comparison of average social characteristics in localities considering, in the
process of adopting or with a TDR program and localities not considering a TDR program
Yes

∞

SD

(n=11)

No
(n=52)

SD

Significance

% White

75.8

8.508

73.0

16.947

.434

% Black

16.1

9.306

19.4

16.164

.377

% Hispanic or Latino

4.6

2.535

3.9

5.188

.525

% Unemployed

5.1

1.235

6.4

2.760

.022*

% In poverty

7.7

2.344

13.4

6.471

.000*

% Urban

44.7

29.675

47.1

41.880

.825

% Rural

55.3

29.675

52.9

41.880

.825

Median Household Income

34,217 4474.752 28,797 8829.652 .006*

% Bachelor’s degree (25 years +)

30.2

11.206

23.1

12.934

.084+

% HS graduate (25 years +)

85.3

5.798

81.5

6.289

.070+

% Land protected

12.8

11.797

12.9

15.325

.980

% Total occupied housing

90.0

6.68

87.4

7.493

.259

% Vacant housing

10

6.678

12.7

7.493

.259

Population Density (per acre)

.40

.348

1.4

2.302

.005*

Population change 1990-2010 (%)

67.7

36.6

26.4

42.7

.623

Renter occupied units

22.0

5.568

30.4

11.776

.001*

∞=all counties with a TDR program, in the process of adopting a TDR program or considering
adopting a TDR program
*=significant at the .05 level
+=significant at the .1 level

While there are substantial differences among localities on certain socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics, only some are statistically significant based on an independent
samples t-test (Table 13). A significant difference at the .05 significance level between renter
occupied housing units, population density, median household income, poverty, and
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unemployment. These results suggest that lower per cent of renter occupied housing units, a
lower population density, higher median household income, lower per cent of the population in
poverty and a lower rate of unemployment, suggest an increased likelihood of a locality adopting
a TDR program. Poverty, unemployment and median household income are correlated variables,
which explains why they all are statistically significant. At the 0.1 significance level, educational
attainment also is seen to have an effect on the adoption of TDR. Therefore, localities with
higher levels of educational attainment are more likely to adopt TDR programs. Other
characteristics such as race, level of urbanity and occupied housing units have no statistically
significant differences, though they may have notable differences.
The literature states that localities pursuing growth management goals are often more
racially homogenous, more affluent, have lower rates of unemployment and higher levels of
educational attainment. Although this research cannot confirm that localities pursuing growth
management goals are more racially homogenous, it does suggest that these areas are more
affluent, have lower rates of unemployment and higher levels of educational attainment.
These findings help corroborate survey responses that indicated many localities do not
see a need for TDR programs. Areas that are more rural frequently have farmland preservation
and growth management goals and feel more development pressures than urban areas. This
commitment to land preservation and growth management could explain why less dense areas
are more commonly considering adopting TDR programs. Furthermore, the percentage of land
protected is almost equal among all localities. This may indicate that other tools are being used
successfully, and confirm the survey finding that there is no need for TDR. Localities with land
preservation and growth management goals may already be employing appropriate techniques to
meet their goals. Furthermore, many survey respondents in urban areas noted that they had no
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need for a TDR program because they were fully developed or had no viable sending or
receiving areas. This also explains why areas considering TDR programs are more rural in
nature.
Similarly, if localities currently have a high housing vacancy rate, they may not be
experiencing development pressures or development demand. In localities not considering
adopting TDR programs, there seems to be a higher rate of poverty and unemployment and lower
median household incomes, which supports the finding that there are economic reasons for not
adopting a TDR program, such as encouraging economic investments and encouraging growth
and development. Localities with high unemployment commonly do not want to restrict growth
and development. Areas with strong economies may be more inclined to adopt growth
management tools to exclude certain types of development from their community. Since growth
management tools may be viewed as exclusionary, localities that are better off financially may
have more flexibility in the types of tools they use. TDR however, does not have to be
exclusionary, and can be used to address multiple concerns within a municipality.

Coordination Among Municipalities
As has been previously stated, Virginia has a unique political situation wherein cities and
counties operate independently of each other. Among survey respondents, 34 (54%) said they
have a low level of coordination with their neighboring localities regarding comprehensive plan
goals and implementation, 12 (19%) responded that they have a moderate level of coordination,
11 (17%) responded that they have no level of coordination and only five (8%) feel that they
have a high level of coordination with neighboring localities with comprehensive plan goals and
implementation (Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Level of Coordination Among Neighboring Localities

Since many cities in Virginia are fully developed and have little open space, it would be
advantageous for cities and neighboring counties to cooperate in using TDR. Cities can provide
the receiving areas while counties can contain the sending areas. Directing growth to urban areas
that have the ability to accommodate increased density makes sense, not only from a land
preservation and environmental perspective, but also from a financial perspective, because
building, infrastructure, and community service costs will be lower. Interjurisdictional transfers
not only make sense but are also allowed under the TDR legislation. This would require a high
level of collaboration among localities, but may be important for managing growth and
preserving land in Virginia.
Another potential option to accommodate growth pressures are UDAs. Among survey
respondents, 48% said their locality is required to have a UDA while 52% are not. Of the
localities required to have a UDA, 83% are counties. Furthermore, 51% of survey respondents
said their locality had at least one UDA and 49% said their locality did not. Of localities with at
least one UDA, 84% are counties. Given that a significant number of localities in the state are
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required to have a UDA based on population growth rates between 1990 and 2000, it would be
advisable to coordinate the planning of a UDA and the adoption of a TDR program. The UDA
requirement signifies that certain localities with extremely high growth rates and growth
pressures must consider more compact development to ease these concerns and any associated
effects. A TDR program could help direct growth to the UDA while also preserving land in the
locality, at little to no cost to the public.

Success Factors and Obstacles for TDR Programs
As noted in the literature, many factors contribute to successful TDR programs. Survey
respondents noted that political support was the most important factor. According to the
literature, without political support, TDR programs are not likely to be approved or to be very
successful. Planning and politics cannot be separated and rely on each other for support.
Development demand and support from receiving area landowners were also of importance. Low
development demand may signal a slow economy or a slow growth rate. It can also suggest that
developers are satisfied with the density that get for free under current by-right zoning
regulations. In this case, planners and policy makers may have to create development demand by
amending the zoning code or only approving special exception or conditional use permits with
the purchase of development rights. Other factors for successful TDR program can be seen in
Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Factors for Successful TDR Programs

Likewise, when asked what are the biggest obstacles to successful TDR programs,
respondents gave many answers, but the top two responses were no development demand/market
for development rights and no political support. Some respondents elaborated by saying that
because there is no demand for development, a TDR program will never work. But, as the
literature points out, development demand does not necessarily pre-exist in a locality and
planners and politicians can help create demand. If the by-right zoning allows for developers to
build enough housing stock to their satisfaction, there is no need to purchase development rights.
Therefore, localities can review their zoning regulations and decrease the allowable by-right
density, or they can approve upzonings or special exceptions only with the purchase of
development rights. When a developer is satisfied with what he can get for free, he will have no
incentive to purchase development rights.
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Furthermore, the governing body must be strong enough to uphold and support
recommendations made by planners as well as to withstand any political opposition or backlash.
Without the support of planners and policy makers, TDR programs are likely to fail, and may not
have enough support to become part of the comprehensive plan. Planners and policy makers
educate the community on the importance of growth management and land preservation goals
and the tools used to achieve them. They can also provide a supportive role to the community
and encourage program acceptance. Other obstacles to successful TDR programs are noted in
Figure 12.
Figure 12: Biggest Obstacles to Successful TDR Programs
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Additional Comments Regarding TDR in Virginia
Localities were asked to provide additional comments regarding TDR programs either in
their locality or in the Commonwealth. Two suggestions were made by localities that are not
considering adopting TDR programs. The first pertains to the state enabling legislation. The
legislation could be changed to allow trades in impervious surface cover (changes in the states
stormwater regulations in the receiving area), provide for the ability to collect impact fees
through exchanges, and provide more clarity on TDR banks (whether or not they are allowed).
Another respondent commented that the state could provide state test program assistance to help
localities thinking of developing a program but that may not have the requisite funds or staff on
their own.

Political Structure and Support
My intention was to gather information to compare the political structure of each locality
with its adoption of various growth management and land preservation tools, including TDR.
However, the survey showed that most localities operate using some type of council-manager
system thus it would be difficult to determine whether or not political structure affects adoption
of growth management and land preservation tools. All localities with TDR programs or
considering/in the process of establishing TDR programs have some form of commissionadministrator government structure, except one. Any difference in results could be attributed to a
sampling error and it therefore would be fruitless to test this variable.
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSIONS

This research sought to understand the reasons why more localities in the Commonwealth
of Virginia are not using transfer of development rights as a tool to manage growth and
development. Although this tool has been authorized in the Code of Virginia since 2006, only
two localities currently have functioning programs. Only half of Virginia’s localities responded
to the survey but results show that very few localities are thinking about, or are in the process of,
establishing TDR programs while the vast majority are not considering TDR at this time.
Nevertheless, the study suggests that localities in Virginia are committed to managing growth
and preserving land. However, they seem to rely heavily on just a few tools even though the
Code of Virginia authorizes the use of many more.

Limitations and Potential for Future Research
The study was constrained by several limitations that must be considered when
interpreting its findings and results. The email survey was sent to Planning Directors or a person
of a similar capacity in each locality. It is possible that the recipient of the survey was unable or
unwilling to respond. There were instances in which the survey recipient forwarded the survey to
another member of the planning staff. These results were counted with all other results.
Time was also a factor. Given more time, more survey responses might have been
obtained. However, a response rate of just under 50% was considered to be more than acceptable
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to proceed with the research. Further research might consider focusing on a smaller number of
localities in which more detailed questions can be asked, or could strive to achieve a higher
response rate from all localities in Virginia by sending more reminders and follow-up emails.
The small sample size is another limitation. This research was limited in the tests it could
run and the conclusions it could draw based on the often small and unevenly weighted data
groups. This small sample does not invalidate the results of this research, but caution should be
used when interpreting them as they may pertain only to the sample surveyed and not to the state
as a whole.
The survey contained mainly multiple choice or categorical questions, but very few openended questions. While interviews might have helped obtain more detailed information, the study
sought to identify only the most basic issues facing localities with regard to the adoption of TDR
programs. Further research could be aimed at more detailed questions of both localities that are
not considering adopting a TDR ordinance as well as localities that are either in the process of
doing so or have already done so. Again, this does not invalidate the results, but clearly there is
potential for future research. For example, community meetings might help to truly gauge the
level of interest among citizens regarding various growth management and land preservation
techniques and outcomes, as well as demonstrate the potential benefits of TDR to their
community.
Despite the limitations of the study, some clear and important results were obtained.
Furthermore, this work has set the stage for future research to examine this issue in more depth.
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Conclusions
Based on the information gathered we can conclude that the state’s localities are not
using TDR because they see no need for it. The most commonly cited reasons for not adopting
TDR programs were that there was no need, no development demand or pressure, or that other
suitable tools are available. Many localities stated that not only was there no need, but no
development demand. However, development demand and need cannot be equated. As the
literature notes, development demand does not necessarily exist in a market for development
rights and planners and policy makers in each locality can help create such demand.
Furthermore, by the time a need exists to manage growth and preserve open space, it may be too
late to use certain tools.
Transfer of development rights can be used as a tool to manage growth and development
in localities facing great pressures, but also as a tool to preserve farmland and open space.
Localities could consider using TDR preemptively as a proactive strategy to preserve farmland
and open space and protect rural character. Although the latest version of the TDR legislation
does not explicitly allow for the development of a TDR bank, localities are not required to make
a direct transfer of development rights between a seller and buyer through the same transaction.
Therefore, localities can interpret the legislation as allowing for the banking of development
rights, and in general, there is no reason to not use TDR to proactively preserve land on account
of its economic, environmental or scenic qualities, or because it may eventually be subject to
development pressures. The legislation should be amended to more clearly state that localities
can bank rights and a working group could offer suggestions on how to make this happen.
Transfer of development rights banks can encourage participation in TDR programs since
the seller can choose to sell his rights at any time instead of waiting for demand to exist. In
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general, TDR programs operate at little or no financial cost to a locality. Administering a TDR
bank however, can be a costly, yet extremely important endeavor. The state could consider using
its Office of Farmland Preservation to act as a statewide TDR bank. Instead of using money to
purchase land outright, the Office of Farmland Preservation could use its funds to buy and hold
development rights for localities wishing to undertake TDR programs. As soon as the banked
development rights are sold to a developer, the Office of Farmland Preservation recoups its funds
and can purchase more development rights. This would remove the cost burden from the locality,
but still enable localities to offer the use of a TDR bank to encourage participation in TDR
programs. Furthermore, the Office of Farmland Preservation could provide important, supportive
functions, such as marketing and education, to localities that may not have the staff or resources
available to provide these services.
Any locality experiencing a significant increase in population likely does not have
adequate housing, and thus any new development could potentially be part of a TDR scheme.
Current housing occupancy statistics suggest that a majority of Virginia localities do not have
excess housing; therefore, any increase in population would necessitate an increase in demand
for residential structures. Such demand could signify a need for TDR. Current zoning regulations
may seem adequate at this time, but with future growth and development, the same regulations
may not be appropriate. These regulations set a precedent for future development that developers
will anticipate and regard as normal. Implementing a growth management program and changing
zoning regulations are best done before the need arises. These proactive steps can preserve rural
character and help ensure well-managed community growth while also saving money in the long
term because compact developments save infrastructure and transportation costs, and can even
save energy.
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However, as Flyvbjerg (1996) points out, because power defines reality and some myths
may persist even if untrue, any locality which does not perceive a need for TDR, will never
develop such a program. Even with a real need, and even with proven benefits of TDR, if those
in power perpetuate myths as truths, TDR may never be successful in Virginia.
Currently, many if not most, localities in Virginia appear to be taking a reactive approach
to planning. They rely heavily on rezonings (conditional zoning/cash proffers) to extract proffers
from developers and on special exception/conditional use permits to approve or deny new
development. Instead of using a comprehensive plan to guide growth and development, localities
are managing these issues in a piecemeal fashion. Not only is this inefficient, it undoubtedly will
prove to be ineffective. This type of planning sets low standards and no limits. No precedent and
no expectations to live up to are established. If a developer is satisfied with what he can get
under current zoning regulations, particularly if there is a legacy of constant rezonings, he will
have no incentive to participate in other types of programs, such as TDR. It appears there is a
need for a paradigm shift in planning in Virginia in order for a program such as TDR to really
take hold. A legacy of reactive planning leaves no room for proactive measures, such as TDR.
Furthermore, the study indicates that few localities rely on impact fees to manage the fiscal
impacts of growth, leaving room for discussion about impact fees and their usefulness as a tool
for localities in Virginia to pursue more proactive planning.
As daunting as it may sound to create a transfer of development rights program in a
locality with no current need, that is the ideal time to do so. The literature indicates that
developing and using a TDR program in a locality facing high growth and development
pressures will not succeed because land costs will be too high and “leap frog” development may
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occur. The time to develop and implement a TDR program is before there is a need so that the
program is already in place when the need arises.
In order to increase the use of TDR, the state should consider offering mandatory
education and training seminars for policy and planning professionals to outline the benefits,
costs and primary means of designing and implementing a TDR program. This research indicated
that many practitioners simply do not understand the benefits of TDR and thus are unwilling to
consider adopting a TDR ordinance. If the state did not feel that TDR was a useful tool, it would
not have authorized its use. Thus, it would be highly beneficial for the state to take a proactive
approach in encouraging the development and use of TDR programs.
Since many localities in the state have urban development areas (UDAs), it would make
sense to combine the development of a UDA with a TDR program. If an area is already being
sited for higher density and increased growth, it would be ideal to protect land at the same time.
There is no point in planning to accommodate increased growth in one location if developers are
still allowed to build in low density, sprawling developments. However, because the state
legislature recently passed a law that no longer requires localities to have a designated Urban
Development Area (Code of Virginia HB 1721), there is less of an incentive to link TDR with
the UDA designation process. The state could consider providing incentives, such as increased
transit funding, to localities that locate TDR receiving areas in designated UDAs.
A key insight from systems theory is that particular end goals can be reached in
numerous ways; there is no one right course of action to achieve desired results. This may
account for the different courses of action that have been used to accommodate growth and
preserve land in the Commonwealth. However, this theory also suggests that the same course of
action may not always produce the same results. “A systems perspective would see options…as a
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way of identifying a package of actions consistent with the desired end-state of the system, its
structural characteristics, and the values of those working within it” (Stewart and Ayers 2001:
88). Thus, even though a locality may pursue a PDR program, or even a TDR program, different
outcomes may be achieved. Localities in Virginia may achieve similar goals through different
mechanisms. According to systems theory, the environment in which a political system exists,
the demands being made and the preferences expressed will have an effect on the outputs
generated and on any future inputs to the political system. Although localities may not explicitly
take account of the environment in which they operate, they are using different tools to achieve
similar outcomes relating to growth management and land preservation.
While growth management and land preservation goals may be achieved through various
means, TDR can be used to achieve both goals at the lowest cost to society. Thus, although PDR,
for example, may be sufficient to achieve a locality’s land preservation goals, the same goals
could be met at a lower cost using TDR. Similarly, localities may currently be able to manage
growth reactively, but proactive measures will be more efficient and effective in the future. If a
locality is working to manage growth, would it not be a good idea to also preserve land at the
same time? Localities are not using TDR largely because it is new, confusing or difficult to
understand and no model or well functioning programs currently exist in Virginia. However,
with TDR localities can achieve with one tool, rather than several, both land preservation and
growth management simultaneously. While many survey respondents noted there was no need
for a TDR program, it would be advisable for them to consider the benefits of TDR over more
traditional tools. Not only can TDR preserve land in perpetuity, it can also direct and manage
growth to achieve, efficient, compact land use, at little or no cost to the government and the
public.

109

It is important to remember that sprawl is not a constitutional right. While the 14th
amendment does guarantee the right to free travel, localities should consider the rights of future
generations to be afforded the same opportunities and quality of life. Proactively managing
growth and development and preserving land does not take away anyone’s constitutional right to
own or profit from land. Furthermore, TDR is not mandatory and citizens have the ability to not
participate if they choose not to do so. While a downzoning may occur and a landowner may lose
the opportunity to develop at a higher by-right density, he benefits from compensation in the
form of development rights that can be sold to developers in the designated receiving area.
This research sought to understand the barriers and limitations facing localities in
Virginia with regard to employing a TDR program to help manage growth and preserve land at
the lowest cost to society. While there were obvious obstacles to TDR in Virginia, they are not
insurmountable. The bigger problem lies not in the adoption of actual TDR programs, but in the
legacy of planning in Virginia. Until planning becomes more proactive and less reactive, TDR
programs are unlikely to be adopted at a significant scale. Hopefully, this research has
highlighted a need for more proactive planning in a state that is facing significant growth
pressures. The time to take the steps to manage growth and development is now, before the need
to do so becomes even greater. Transfer of development rights programs certainly have a place in
planning in Virginia and can help localities achieve a number of goals simultaneously. However,
if localities continue down the current path of reactive planning, TDR will be rendered useless.
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